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I. Introduction
Consider the following hypothetical: William Defendant is
charged with first degree murder. William and his mother scrape
together $15,000, deplete their life savings, and hire an attorney
to represent William in the early stages of his criminal trial before
his bail hearing. 1 Prior to the beginning of jury selection, however,
William becomes dissatisfied with his attorney’s minimal
communication and trial strategy and wishes to fire him. William’s
hired attorney files a motion to withdraw from the case. The court
is aware that if it permits William’s attorney to withdraw from the
case it will be required to either appoint William a new lawyer or
find that he is able to proceed pro se before proceeding with jury
selection due to William’s inability to pay for future
representation. The court is presented with a dilemma: does
William have to satisfy a good cause showing to dismiss his
retained counsel and have the court appoint counsel? If the answer
to the first question is yes, what does that good cause showing
require William to prove?
As American jurisprudence currently stands, this question is
in a state of flux. The Ninth 2 and Eleventh Circuits 3 do not require
any showing for a criminal defendant to dismiss retained counsel
and seek court-appointed counsel, while the First Circuit 4 requires
a showing of good cause for a criminal defendant to dismiss
retained counsel and seek court-appointed counsel. 5 The question
1. See Dixon v. Owens, 865 P.2d 1250, 1251 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993) (basing
the hypothetical on the facts of the denial of Mr. Dixon’s motion to substitute
appointed counsel for retained counsel).
2. United States v. Brown, 785 F.3d 1337 (9th Cir. 2015).
3. United States v. Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2016).
4. United States v. Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2004).
5. Compare Brown, 785 F.3d at 1344 (finding that a criminal defendant is
entitled to the Sixth Amendment right to discharge his retained counsel and to
proceed with different, court-appointed attorney instead), and Jimenez-Antunez,
820 F.3d at 1271 (“A defendant exercises the right to counsel of choice when he
moves to dismiss retained counsel, regardless of the type of counsel he wishes to
engage afterward.”) (emphasis added), with Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d at 46–47
(“[T]here are two actions of the court at issue: its refusal to allow Sanchez to
withdraw and its refusal to appoint substitute counsel . . . . [A] defendant is not
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presented by these conflicting requirements—one that this Note
seeks to resolve—is whether a criminal defendant who qualifies for
appointed counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A and wishes to dismiss
currently retained counsel and seek appointed counsel must show
“good cause” to dismiss their retained counsel. Good cause in this
context refers to “a fundamental problem, ‘such as a conflict of
interest, a complete breakdown in communication or an
irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust
verdict.’” 6
Suppose William is required to make a good cause showing to
dismiss his currently retained counsel—why should this matter?
Legally, such a showing prohibits William from asserting two of
the rights protected under the Sixth Amendment—the right to
counsel of choice and the right to court-appointed counsel—unless
he can satisfy the required showing.7 Practically, unless William
can make this good cause showing, he will be forced to proceed with
the counsel who he wishes to fire or to represent himself in his
criminal trial. An appellate court should treat this denial as a
structural error warranting reversal of the criminal proceeding. 8
This denial of William’s fundamental right to the assistance of
counsel will now require a new criminal trial in which William will
be granted his right to counsel of choice. The prospect of a new trial
may raise concerns of economic cost and general efficiency, the
likely motivators for requiring a showing of good cause in the first
instance. 9 The question of whether William should be required to

ordinarily dependent on the court’s permission to replace retained counsel. But
here the two actions merge . . . .”).
6. United States v. Garey, 540 F.3d 1253, 1263 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting
United States v. Young, 482 F.2d 993, 995 (5th Cir. 1973)).
7. See Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d at 46–47 (describing the court’s requirement
that the defendant satisfy a showing of good cause to replace counsel with
court-appointed counsel).
8. See United States v. Davila, 133 S. Ct. 2139, 2142 (2013) (“[S]tructural
errors [such as] denial of counsel of choice . . . trigger automatic reversal because
they undermine the fairness of the entire criminal proceeding.”).
9. See State v. Cromwell, 119 P.3d 448, 454 (Ariz. 2005) (“[W]hen
considering a motion to substitute counsel, the judge evaluates several factors
designed specifically to balance the rights and interests of the defendant against
the public interest in judicial economy, efficiency and fairness.” (citing State v.
Moody, 968 P.2d 578, 580 (Ariz. 1998))).
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satisfy an initial good cause showing has produced different
answers from courts across the country.
If William Defendant finds himself in the First Circuit as he
moves to fire his retained counsel and seek court-appointed
counsel, he had better be sure he has the evidence to satisfy a good
cause showing.10 Alternatively, if William Defendant finds himself
in the Ninth or Eleventh Circuits, then he does not need to make
any showing and the court must grant his motion unless a denial
is “compelled by ‘purposes inherent in the fair, efficient and orderly
administration of justice.’” 11 This Note seeks to resolve these
disparate results. 12 Conditioning William’s right to fire retained
counsel on his ability to show good cause imposes a burden on this
fundamental right recognized by the Supreme Court.13 This
quasi-denial violates William’s fundamental right to counsel
expressly guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
Part II of this Note addresses the history and evolution of the
right to counsel. 14 Part III examines the different approaches
employed by the federal circuit courts for handling a criminal
defendant’s request to substitute appointed counsel for retained
counsel and to thus assert both the right to counsel of choice and
10. See Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d at 47 (requiring a showing of good cause
prior to the court’s grant of a defendant’s motion to dismiss retained counsel and
seek court appointment of new counsel).
11. United States v. Brown, 785 F.3d 1337, 1347 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting
United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 2010)).
12. See discussion infra Part IV (discussing the necessity of treating a
criminal defendant’s motion to discharge retained counsel and seek
court-appointed counsel as two separate actions). To allow these actions to merge,
as the First Circuit does in United States v. Mota-Santana, creates confusion and
may lead to the conclusion that such a criminal defendant must show good cause
before being permitted to substitute court-appointed counsel for retained counsel.
Id.
13. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147–48 (2006) (“The
right to select counsel of one’s choice . . . has been regarded as the root meaning
of the constitutional guarantee [of the Sixth Amendment].”); see also Kaley v.
United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1107 (2014) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“An
individual’s right to counsel of choice is violated ‘whenever the defendant’s choice
is wrongfully denied,’ and such error ‘pervades the entire trial.’” (quoting
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 150)).
14. See discussion infra Part II (laying the groundwork for the American
tradition, discussing the inception of the American right to the assistance of
counsel, and addressing the eventual adoption, and later evolution of the Sixth
Amendment).
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right to court-appointed counsel. 15 In Part IV, this Note advocates
that an indigent criminal defendant’s motion to discharge retained
counsel and thereafter seek court-appointed counsel ought to be
treated as two distinct and independent actions. 16 Part V discusses
the practical implications of the proposed judicial framework and
concludes that such a treatment is necessary to enable indigent
criminal defendants the full enjoyment of their Sixth Amendment
rights. 17
II. The Historical Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” 18 The Counsel Clause, 19 as
it is aptly named, has evolved considerably since its ratification in
the Bill of Rights and now encompasses five distinct rights: (1) the
right to counsel of choice; 20 (2) the right to court-appointed
counsel; 21 (3) the right to conflict-free counsel; 22 (4) the right to the
15. See discussion infra Part III (detailing the cases that present the circuit
split, explaining their holdings, and discussing their impact on criminal
defendants).
16. See discussion infra Part IV (arguing that independent treatment of the
actions included in a defendant’s motion allows for a fuller realization and
enjoyment of their Sixth Amendment rights, a necessary treatment due to the
absence of a remedy for violations of the right to counsel of choice).
17. See discussion infra Part V (acknowledging the limitations of the
proposed treatment and concluding that such a treatment is necessary to fulfill
the court’s obligation under the Sixth Amendment).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
19. See Laurie S. Fulton, The Right to Counsel Clause of the Sixth
Amendment, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1599, 1605 (1989) (“The responsibility for
determining the scope of the right to counsel clause has fallen to the courts in the
United States as it had in historical England.”).
20. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 147–48 (“The right to select counsel of
one’s choice . . . has been regarded as the root meaning of the constitutional
guarantee [of the Sixth Amendment].”).
21. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“[I]n our adversary
system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”).
22. See Bonin v. California, 494 U.S. 1039, 1044 (1990) (“[A] defendant who
shows an actual conflict need not demonstrate that his counsel’s divided loyalties
prejudiced the outcome of his trial.” (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349–
50 (1980))); see also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490 (1978) (“The mere
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effective assistance of counsel; 23 and (5) the right to represent
oneself pro se. 24 Accordingly, rights now firmly understood to be a
part of the guarantee to assistance of counsel, although previously
not recognized, have developed and become of central importance
to Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. 25 In a concurring opinion in
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 26 Chief Justice Burger concluded that
“[t]he right to counsel has historically been an evolving concept.” 27
Understanding this full evolution of the Sixth Amendment
guarantee, from its inception to its current state, is critical to
determining how courts ought to respond when a defendant asserts
a right that conflicts with another protected by the amendment or
other legal requirement.28

physical presence of an attorney does not fulfill the Sixth Amendment guarantee
when the advocate’s conflicting obligations have effectively sealed his lips on
crucial matters.”).
23. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (“[T]he purpose
of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is . . . to ensure that
criminal defendants receive a fair trial.”).
24. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975)
The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall be
made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to
make his defense. Although not stated in the Amendment in so many
words, the right to self-representation—to make one’s own defense
personally—is thus necessarily implied by the structure of the
Amendment.
25. See John D. King, Beyond “Life and Liberty”: The Evolving Right to
Counsel, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 6 (2013) (“[S]ubsequent interpreters of the
Sixth Amendment have found a right to counsel much broader than that foreseen
by the Framers, and one more consonant with the values of a changing cultural
context.”).
26. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
27. Id. at 44 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
28. See Margaret J. Ryan, The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel: A
Criminal Defendant’s Right to Counsel of Choice v. the Courts’ Interest in
Conflict-Free Representation, 14 S. ILL. U. L.J. 657, 658 (1989) (disputing the
Supreme Court’s decision in Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988) to allow
substantial latitude to lower courts in refusing waiver of conflict of interest by a
criminal defendant seeking their right to counsel in cases where a conflict may
exist).
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A. English Common Law
Considering the broad Sixth Amendment rights to counsel
that defendants enjoy today, it may be surprising that the right to
counsel had a very narrow beginning.29 The evolution and
expansion of the Counsel Clause reflects the development of the
American criminal justice system and the importance of
protections for criminal defendants within this system. 30
Specifically, the growth of the Sixth Amendment has furthered the
notion that criminal defendants are entitled to heightened
protections and privileges within a criminal trial because of what
is at stake.31 Consequently, it is important to note the critical
differences between what a criminal trial involved during early

29. See JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, THE RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 1
(2002) (“Originally, only those accused of minor offenses could be represented by
counsel; those charged with serious offenses were denied the opportunity for legal
representation.”).
30. See Emily Garcia Uhrig, A Case for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in
Habeas Corpus, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 541, 545 (2008) (“Since the United States
Supreme Court first began to evaluate the parameters of the constitutional right
to counsel in criminal cases, it has underscored the essential role of the ‘guiding
hand of counsel’ in enforcing the principles of justice enunciated and elevated in
the Constitution.”).
31. See Wilcher v. State, 697 So. 2d 1087, 1117 (Miss. 1997) (Sullivan, J.,
dissenting) (“[C]riminal law requires more than an equal playing field. Criminal
defendants are entitled to heightened protection in criminal law, such as the
Eighth Amendment right to allow all mitigating evidence at the sentencing stage,
or as reflected in the rules of evidence . . . .”); see also Michael M. Raeber, Toward
an Integrated Rule Prohibiting all Race-Based Peremptory Challenges: Some
Considerations on Georgia v. McCollum, 26 GA. L. REV. 503, 529 (1992)
Professor Goldwasser . . . contends that criminal defendants deserve
preferential treatment in the use of peremptory challenges for two
reasons: first, disparate treatment is justified because such asymmetry
is inherent in the constitutional protections afforded criminal
defendants; second, criminal defendants are entitled to differential
treatment because what is at stake for a criminal defendant is
“intensely personal.”
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English common law32 and what exists in the American system
today.33
Under English common law, criminal charges were typically
brought by the afflicted party, or their hired representation, and
trials were quick and informal. 34 The jurors, the defendant, and
the prosecutor actively engaged with the evidence, asking
questions by simply blurting them out in open court. 35 The judge
served more as a referee, adding an element of supervision to an
otherwise disorderedly proceeding. 36 A criminal defendant
experienced a number of severe obstacles to presenting an effective
defense, 37 but none more sweeping than the prohibition of the
accused from employing counsel. 38

32. See TOMKOVICZ, supra note 29, at 1
[E]arly English law reveals that the right to counsel had surprisingly
modest beginnings . . . . The monarch’s refusal to permit counsel for
those who stood to lose the most was rooted in a fear that lawyers
would prevent the successful prosecution and punishment of those
whose acts most threatened the state’s survival.
33. See id. at 2 (discussing the American evolution of the right to the
assistance of counsel after the initial rejection of England’s restrictive approach).
34. See id. at 1–2 (explaining the nature of criminal defense trials in
late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth-century England).
35. See id. at 3 (“The private prosecutor—the victim or a representative—
would present his testimony and the testimony of other witnesses, and the
accused, unaided by counsel, would respond to the evidence. The defendant, like
the jurors, could ask questions of witnesses at any time simply by blurting them
out.”).
36. See id. (stating that the chaotic trial environment was supervised by a
judge who sat to make sure illegal procedures were not used by the parties).
37. Felony criminal defendants were typically confined until the time of trial.
Id. (citing J.M. Beattie, Scales of Justice: Defense Counsel and the English
Criminal Trial in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 9 LAW. & HIS. REV.
221, 223 (1991)). Further, a criminal defendant did not receive a copy of his
indictment, was not informed of the prosecution’s evidence against him, and had
no set procedures for compelling a witness to testify. Id. (citing Francis H. Heller,
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 10 (Univ. of Kan. Press 1951); J.M. Beattie,
CRIMES AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND, 1660–1800 271 (Princeton Univ. Press
1986); J.M. Beattie, Scales of Justice: Defense Counsel and the English Criminal
Trial in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 9 LAW. & HIS. REV. 221, 223
(1991)).
38. See id. (“[A] common law rule . . . prohibited those accused of . . . serious
offenses from employing lawyers to assist in their defense.” (citing JAMES
FITZGERALD STEPHENS, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 397 (1883))).
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Under early English common law, the criminal defendant’s
right to counsel varied based upon the alleged offense. 39 In general,
“[f]or less serious crimes classified as trespasses or
misdemeanors—offenses that could be punished only by
incarceration or pecuniary loss—a defendant could employ a
lawyer to present his defense.” 40 In contrast, until the middle of
the eighteenth century, a criminal defendant charged with a more
serious crime, “such as murder, manslaughter, larceny, robbery, or
rape, or treason or misprision of treason,” was prohibited from
employing counsel to aid in their defense. 41 British courts were
well aware of the potential cost of providing counsel for sweeping
groups of criminal defendants and consequently were interested in
avoiding it. 42
There were several rationales behind the prohibition of
lawyers for criminal defendants accused of serious crimes. For the
courts to provide counsel, society must bear the financial cost of
paying for these lawyers.43 Additionally, courts perceived criminal
defense lawyers as strains on society, further frustrating the jobs
of police and prosecutors. 44 Therefore, a policy against providing
counsel to defendants accused of a serious crime was justified by
self-preservation: “The assistance of counsel was seen as an
impediment to efficient and successful prosecution and
punishment.” 45 Further, the state suggested “that the assistance
39. See id. (explaining that at English common law criminal defendants
charged with less serious offenses were better able to retain counsel while those
charged with felonies could not).
40. Id. (citing WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN
COURTS 8 (Univ. Mich. Publ’ns 1955)).
41. See id. (stating the English common law policy concerning
representation for criminal defendants accused of serious crimes).
42. See King, supra note 25, at 7 (stating the cost to British society of
providing counsel for broad groups of defendants).
43. See id. (stating the inevitable financial cost imposed on society as a result
of paying lawyers for defendants entitled to counsel).
44. See id. (“[T]he additional lawyers can be seen as imposing a cost on
society by making the job of the police and prosecution more difficult.”).
45. TOMKOVICZ, supra note 29, at 4. Several rationalizations supported a
total prohibition of the assistance of counsel for defendants charged with serious
crimes, such as the belief that individuals brought to trial were assumed guilty
and considered threats to the state. See id. (stating the assumption that
defendants were presumed guilty and considered a danger to the state thus
necessitating a quick and successful prosecution). Further, allowing the accused
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of counsel was ‘hardly necessary’ because criminal proceedings
were sufficiently simple for an accused—at least an innocent
accused—to cope with by himself.” 46 At this point in English
common law, even if a criminal defendant was permitted to retain
counsel, there was no right to the assistance of counsel. 47
The prohibition on engaging defense counsel in serious cases
slowly diminished with the emergence of professional prosecutors
and a strengthened police force. 48 This development occurred at a
point when the English government was more stable and no longer
necessitated an emphasis on self-preservation. 49 Beginning at the
end of the seventeenth Century and continuing throughout the
eighteenth Century, criminal defendants accused of a broad
spectrum of crimes retained counsel more frequently.50 In fact,
“[b]y the end of the eighteenth century, judges were frequently
permitting those accused of felonies to be assisted by counsel, and
defense lawyers were being allowed to perform most defense
functions . . . .”51 Yet, this transformation was not as broad as it
may seem—judges exercised considerable discretion as to whether
to allow defense counsel and, if so, the degree to which the attorney
could participate in the proceedings. 52 There were no “codified or
to retain counsel would threaten self-preservation efforts necessary to protect the
state. For example, the weak police force meant less evidence could be collected
against the accused and consequently a greater possibility of counsel preventing
convictions. See id. (“By obstructing the criminal process and sometimes
preventing convictions, counsel could interfere with the state’s self-protective
efforts.”).
46. Id. (citing THEODORE F. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW 410 (1948)).
47. See King, supra note 25, at 7 (“Those charged with less serious crimes
(generally, those not punishable by death) were entitled to retain counsel, but no
right to the assistance of counsel existed beyond the right to retain one’s own
counsel at personal expense.” (emphasis added)).
48. See id. (explaining the cause of the decline of the prohibition on defense
counsel participation in serious criminal trials).
49. See TOMKOVICZ, supra note 29, at 7 (“An additional reason that the courts
were willing to depart from the restrictive common law rule was that the
government had grown much more stable in the late seventeenth century. The
increased security of the state diminished the concern with self-preservation.”).
50. See id. at 6 (describing the development of a criminal defendant’s right
to counsel in the English common law).
51. Id.
52. See id. at 7 (stating that although criminal defendants were more
frequently permitted to retain counsel, this right and its scope depended entirely
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uniform rules that dictated the scope of counsel’s involvement in
each case.”53 The lack of codified rules concerning the assistance of
counsel resulted in an uneven distribution of the right and led to
concerns about the integrity of, what was perceived as, an
arbitrary system.54
Despite William Blackstone’s urging that the need for
counsel’s assistance was “worthy [of] the imposition of the
legislature,” British criminal proceedings persisted without
legislative guarantees of the right to counsel. 55 In fact, while the
Sixth Amendment was in the process of drafting and ratification
in the United States, “England still only guaranteed the right to
retain counsel to defendants charged with misdemeanors, and
even then only at their own expense.”56 Even prior to the adoption
of the Sixth Amendment, however, American colonies began to
recognize the importance of this issue and developed a much
broader (though uncodified) concept of the right to counsel than
the English courts. 57
B. The Beginnings of the American Tradition
Similar to the development of criminal defendants’ right to
counsel in English common law, the American colonies experienced
an evolution of the right to the assistance of counsel prior to the
adoption of the Sixth Amendment.58 In the early colonial period,
the criminal justice system resembled England’s under the
common law regime; criminal trials were informal and private

on the judge’s discretion).
53. Id.
54. See WILLIAM H. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 10
(Univ. Mich. Publ’ns 1955) (noting that the absence of a statutory basis for
counsel’s assistance resulted in a wide variety of applications).
55. Id. at 8.
56. King, supra note 25, at 7 (citing JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, THE RIGHT TO THE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 8 (2002)).
57. See id. at 8. (stating the early development of the criminal defendant’s
right to counsel in the American colonies).
58. See TOMKOVICZ, supra note 29, at 9 (“[M]ost of the colonies departed
dramatically from the restrictive approach to counsel of the British common
law.”).
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parties prosecuted the crimes. 59 Criminal defendants, on the other
hand, typically represented themselves due to a lack of
well-trained attorneys and a general distrust for the legal
profession. 60 However, at the time the Sixth Amendment was
ratified and recognized a federal right to the assistance of counsel,
“at least eleven of the thirteen states had enacted, either by
constitution or statute, a general right to be represented by
counsel . . . .” 61 This amendment responded to the threat to an
accused’s rights and interests stemming from a criminal
prosecution in an adversarial system by recognizing the necessity
of defense counsel. 62
The development of this right in the United States paralleled
its development in the British courts. By the time of the American
Revolution, professional prosecutors in every colony were handling
criminal cases. 63 The number of trained lawyers similarly
increased steadily, which made it easier for a criminal defendant
to retain legal assistance. 64 Further, the public attitude concerning
lawyers changed “as the colonists came to recognize the critical
roles that counsel could play in protecting individual rights and
liberties against oppressive or overreaching government
authorities.” 65 Each of these changes in the American colonies
helped further develop and expand the right to counsel. 66
Even so, when the Constitution was signed in September of
1787, there was no mention of the criminal defendant’s right to

59. See id. (analogizing the early American colonial criminal justice
processes to the system that operated in the English common law).
60. See id. (stating why criminal defendants in American colonies chose to
proceed without retaining counsel).
61. Id.
62. See id. at 10 (explaining that the denial of representation to a criminal
defendant was unfair due to the implications and stigmas associated with a
criminal prosecution and the critical role that defense counsel can play).
63. See id. at 9 (stating that by the American revolution every colony
employed professionally trained and funded lawyers to prosecute criminal
charges).
64. See id. (explaining the development of the colonial right to counsel by
showing the increased availability of trained legal representation).
65. Id. at 10.
66. See id. (stating that the culmination of the changes that occurred in the
colonial period allowed for the development of the right to counsel).
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assistance of counsel—or any liberty interests for that matter. 67
The delegates quickly rejected the proposed articulation of
liberties to be protected from government intrusion, including, for
example, the right to assistance of counsel.68 It later became clear
during the “ratification debates that the Constitution would not be
ratified in the state conventions without a bill of rights.” 69 James
Madison proposed an initial draft of the amendments in June of
1789, which included the text of what would become the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.70 The proposed amendment
“includ[ed] in its declaration that ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy . . . the right to assistance of counsel for his
defence.’” 71 The delegates agreed to this construction and in 1791
it became the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution. 72
C. The Right to Court-Appointed Counsel
Following the ratification of the Sixth Amendment in 1791,
the right to counsel expanded to eventually encompass a critical

67. We can attribute the inattention to criminal defendants’ rights in the
Constitution to two distinct reasons. First, the states maintained a wide variety
of processes and it seemed unlikely that the convention would be able to reach an
acceptable consensus on a uniform set of federal rights. See id. at 15 (“[T]he wide
variation in procedures among the states made it seem unlikely that consensus
could be reached regarding the rights that should be included in the national
charter.”). Second, the Framers believed that the state criminal justice systems
would be responsible for the majority of the criminal prosecutions. See id. (stating
that state criminal justice systems were the presumed outlet for criminal
prosecutions, thus making the discussion of the rights of federal defendants seem
unnecessary). With this assumption, it did not make sense to spend time
developing the rights for federal criminal defendants. See id. (explaining why the
Framers seemingly ignored the rights of criminal defendants in drafting the
Constitution).
68. See id. (stating that George Mason’s motion to include a Bill of Rights to
the Constitution was immediately rejected without debate or comment).
69. Id. at 17.
70. See id. at 19 (detailing Madison’s efforts and proposed draft of
amendments to Congress, including the fourth proposition which would later
become part of the Sixth Amendment).
71. Id. at 20 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI).
72. See id. (“In 1791, that provision became the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.”).
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right for criminal defendants—the right of indigent criminal
defendants to court-appointed counsel. 73
1. Powell v. Alabama
In 1932, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Powell v.
Alabama 74 and first established the constitutional right to
court-appointed counsel. 75 The Court was faced with the case of the
“Scottsboro Boys,” as it has become known in the years since the
decision. 76 In March of 1931, nine black youths found themselves
sitting in the Scottsboro jail charged with the rape of two white
girls they claimed to have never seen before.77 The trials began just
twelve days after their arrest and the Scottsboro Boys did not have
much in terms of counsel.78 Unsurprisingly, “[f]our juries, trying
the defendants two or three at a time, quickly concluded that the
Scottsboro Boys were guilty.”79 On appeal, the defendants
contended they had been denied their right to counsel and were
entitled to a new trial. 80 In response to the seminal question of
73. See King, supra note 25, at 8 (expressing the development of the right to
counsel in the United States after the adoption of the Sixth Amendment).
74. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
75. See id. at 71 (finding the constitutional right to appointed counsel in
specific circumstances of capital cases).
76. See Douglas O. Linder, Without Fear or Favor: Judge James Edwin
Horton and the Trial of the Scottsboro Boys, 68 UMKC L. REV. 549, 549 (1999)
(describing the lasting impact of Powell).
77. See id. (describing the charges brought against the group of men who
later became known as the Scottsboro Boys).
78. See id. at 552 (describing the counsel for the criminal defendants as the
initial appointment of the entire local bar and later an out of town lawyer
accompanied by an old and unreliable local lawyer). Stephen Roddy and Milo
Moody served as counsel for the Scottsboro defendants. Id. “Roddy was an
out-of-state real estate attorney who, on the first day of trial, ‘was so stewed he
could scarcely walk straight,’ while sixty-nine-year-old Moody was a ‘doddering,
extremely unreliable, senile individual’ who was ‘losing whatever ability he once
had.’” Id. In addition to the general inability to meet the task at bar, the attorneys
had less than a half-hour to interview their clients prior to trial. See id.
(discussing the attorneys’ ability to prepare the case before the trials began).
Further, the defense lawyers “offered no cross-examination of the state’s medical
evidence, made nothing of differences between the accounts of [the alleged
victims], and presented no closing argument.” Id.
79. Id.
80. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 50 (1932) (considering the issues on
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whether the Scottsboro Boys were constitutionally entitled to
court-appointed counsel, the Court articulated a narrow class of
defendants entitled to appointed counsel, but extended the right
no further. 81 The Court stated:
[I]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ
counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense
because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like,
it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign
counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law;
and that duty is not discharged by an assignment at such a time
or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of
effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case.82

The Court reasoned that “[t]o hold otherwise would be to ignore
the fundamental postulate . . . ‘that there are certain immutable
principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free
government . . . .’”83 The Supreme Court’s opinion in Powell also
included a statement that acknowledged the importance of defense
counsel and the connection to the reliability of the evidence:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if
it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no
skill in the science of law . . . . He requires the guiding hand of
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without
it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction
because he does not know how to establish his innocence.84

In Powell, however, the Court intentionally narrowed the scope of
its holding and left open questions about how this right would
apply in cases involving less serious charges and less compelling
circumstances. 85 The narrow holding and fact-specific nature of
Powell were flexible, but did not provide a definite framework for
appeal before the Supreme Court and discussing only the supposed denial of the
right to counsel).
81. See id. at 71 (discussing the necessity of deciding the case before the
Court today and the need to go no further).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 71–72 (citing Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898)).
84. Id. at 68–69.
85. See King, supra note 25, at 9 (explaining the narrow holding of the
Supreme Court’s 1932 decision providing a criminal defendant with the right to
court-appointed counsel).
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future courts to follow. 86 Further, the holding did not ensure future
defendants the same constitutional protection because the decision
defined a narrow subset of criminal defendants entitled to counsel,
but extended the right no further.87
2. Johnson v. Zerbst
In 1938, six years later, the Supreme Court heard Johnson v.
Zerbst 88 and considered whether the relevant Sixth Amendment
guarantee included a categorical right to court-appointed counsel
for indigent federal defendants. 89 In Zerbst, the petitioner was
indicted for possession of counterfeit money. While the petitioner
was represented at his preliminary hearing, he was unable to
further afford counsel and thus proceeded to his criminal trial
without counsel where he was convicted and sentenced. 90 The
evidence showed that petitioner made a request to the District
Attorney to have counsel appointed, but was quickly denied and
told he had no right to counsel. 91
The Zerbst Court proceeded to highlight the critical
importance that the right to counsel plays for a federal defendant
facing criminal prosecution. 92 The Court decided against a
case-by-case analysis in concluding that “[t]he Sixth Amendment
withholds from federal courts, in all criminal proceedings, the
power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty
86. See id. (articulating the shortcomings of the Powell decision).
87. See id. (stating the subsequent implications of the Supreme Court’s
narrow holding in Powell).
88. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
89. See id. at 459 (considering whether in all federal criminal prosecutions
an indigent defendant is entitled to assistance of counsel).
90. See id. at 460 (discussing the procedural history of the case before the
Court).
91. See id. (“[P]etitioner’s evidence . . . [showed] that [a] request was made
to the District Attorney . . . . [who] had indicated petitioner had no right to
counsel.”).
92. See id. at 462–63 (“[The Sixth Amendment] embodies a realistic
recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the
professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with
power to take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by
experienced and learned counsel.”).
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unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel.” 93 Notably
however, the Court once again narrowed the holding by declining
to extend this categorical grant to state court criminal
proceedings. 94 The decision not to extend this right to state
criminal defendants ensured that such defendants continued to
have no constitutional right to demand counsel if they were unable
to personally afford a lawyer. 95
3. Betts v. Brady
Just four years later, in Betts v. Brady,96 the Supreme Court
declined to recognize a categorical right to court-appointed counsel
for state-court indigent defendants. 97 The Court addressed a state
court’s denial of counsel to a defendant charged with robbery after
the state court informed the defendant that counsel would only be
appointed for rape and murder prosecutions. 98 The Court stated
that the right to assistance of counsel was “not a fundamental
right, essential to a fair trial” and the states were not obligated
under the Due Process Clause to provide a categorical right of
counsel to criminal defendants. 99 The Supreme Court’s express
declaration that the right to court-appointed counsel was not
fundamental lent credence to each state court’s denial of counsel
to criminal defendants. 100 States could have a policy of appointing
93. Id. at 463.
94. See King, supra note 25, at 9 (stating the Court’s decision to narrow the
holding of Zerbst to apply only to federal indigent criminal defendants).
95. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) (“The Sixth Amendment
withholds from federal courts . . . the power and authority to deprive an accused
of his life or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel.” (emphasis
added)).
96. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
97. See id. at 473 (stating the decision not to extend the holding of Zerbst to
state court criminal proceedings).
98. See id. at 456–57 (describing the facts of the case).
99. See id. at 471 (“This material demonstrates that, in the great majority of
the States, it has been the considered judgment of the people, their
representatives and their courts that appointment of counsel is not a fundamental
right, essential to a fair trial.”).
100. See id. at 471–72 (“[W]e are unable to say that . . . due
process . . . obligates the states, whatever may be their own views, to furnish
counsel in every . . . case. Every court has power, if it deems proper, to appoint
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counsel in cases of rape or murder, but they were under no
constitutional obligation to supply any criminal defendant with
counsel. 101
It was not until 1963, over twenty years after the Betts
decision, that the Supreme Court overruled Betts in Gideon v.
Wainwright, 102 upon a finding that Sixth Amendment, through the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, entitles state court
indigent defendants to court-appointed counsel. 103 Gideon would
become the seminal case on the right to court-appointed counsel. 104
4. Gideon and Its Progeny
Clarence Earl Gideon was charged with the felony of breaking
and entering with the intent to commit a misdemeanor. 105 He
appeared in court and requested that the court appoint him a
lawyer because he was unable to afford counsel. 106 The judge
presiding over Mr. Gideon’s case denied his request and stated that
Florida law only required the court to appoint counsel for an
indigent criminal defendant in capital cases. 107 Mr. Gideon was
convicted and sentenced, but the Supreme Court granted review to
reconsider the holding of Betts. 108 The Supreme Court noted the
significant similarities between Mr. Gideon’s case and the Betts
case in 1942, and concluded that to uphold Betts “would require
counsel where that course seems to be required in the interest of fairness.”).
101. See id. at 471 (“[T]he matter [of appointment of counsel] has generally
been deemed one of legislative policy.”).
102. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
103. See id. at 345 (“The Court in Betts v. Brady departed from the sound
wisdom upon which the Court’s holding in Powell v. Alabama rested . . . . [I]t
should now be overruled.”).
104. See King, supra note 25, at 9 (“[T]he Court . . . eventually establish[ed]
the categorical right to court-appointed counsel in any serious case in Gideon v.
Wainwright.”).
105. See TOMKOVICZ, supra note 29, at 32 (stating the charges brought against
Mr. Gideon in the Florida courts).
106. See id. (detailing Mr. Gideon’s initial request for the court to appoint him
counsel).
107. See id. (detailing the Florida judge’s response when Mr. Gideon
requested that he be appointed counsel for his felony charge).
108. See id. (stating the procedural history of Mr. Gideon’s case and the
reason that the Supreme Court granted his writ of certiorari).
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rejection of Gideon’s contention that he had a due process
entitlement to appointed counsel.” 109 Instead, the Supreme Court
held that the Betts Court made a significant error in determining
that the guarantee of counsel was not a fundamental right made
obligatory on the states by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.110 In fact, the Court stated that the
fundamental nature of this right had been first decided years
earlier in Powell v. Alabama, despite the previous Court’s decision
to limit the holding. 111 The Court chose to ground its argument on
the basis of comparison: why would governments choose to spend
vast amounts of money to employ professional prosecutors, unless
the presence of counsel “was necessary for the proper functioning
of the legal system?”112
Gideon marked a further extension of the categorical right of
indigent criminal defendants to the assistance of counsel and
returned to the path forged by Powell prior to the Court’s decision
in Betts. 113 Additionally, the Court emphasized that defense
counsel plays a critical role in ensuring a fair trial for all criminal
defendants. 114 While the Gideon decision marked an important
turn in the tide for criminal defendants facing serious charges, the
Court declined to further define when this right could be asserted
by criminal defendants by failing to specify what constituted a
“serious criminal charge” entitling a defendant to court-appointed
counsel. 115
109. Id.
110. See id. (stating that the Betts Court erred when it determined that the
Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel was not a fundamental
right).
111. See id. (“According to the Gideon Court, the fundamental nature of the
right to counsel had been established in Powell v. Alabama—ten years before
Betts was decided. Although the Powell Court limited its holding . . . ‘its
conclusions about the fundamental nature of the right of counsel [were]
unmistakable.’” (quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963))).
112. King, supra note 25, at 10.
113. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“In returning to
these old precedents, sounder we believe than the new, we but restore
constitutional principles established to achieve a fair system of justice.”).
114. See id. (“Not only these precedents but also reason and reflection require
us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled
into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless
counsel is provided for him.”).
115. See King, supra note 25, at 10 (“Although the Court again left open the
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In the absence of clear instructions on how to apply the right
to court-appointed counsel, state courts and legislatures diverged
regarding what constituted a “serious crime,” thereby entitling a
defendant to counsel. 116 Later cases defined the contours of the
right and limited the right to appointed counsel in non-felony
prosecutions. 117
Argersinger v. Hamlin 118 was the Supreme Court’s first
attempt at refining this right to court-appointed counsel. 119
Petitioner had been charged with carrying a concealed weapon, “an
offense punishable by imprisonment up to six months, a $1,000
fine, or both.” 120 Petitioner proceeded to trial unrepresented by an
attorney, was sentenced to serve ninety days in jail, and brought
his appeal alleging he was deprived of his right to be represented
by counsel. 121 The Court agreed that the trial court denied
petitioner his Sixth Amendment right and “for the first time
explicitly expanded the Gideon rule beyond the felony arena.” 122
The Court rationalized this expansion by stating that in almost
every other context, the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment apply
to all criminal cases regardless of the seriousness of the charged

precise contours of the right, the Court held that it was an ‘obvious truth’ that
fairness required that counsel be appointed for any indigent defendant facing a
serious criminal charge.” (quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344
(1963))).
116. See id. at 11 (“[S]tate courts and legislatures came to different
conclusions regarding whether the right was limited to felonies, serious crimes
(defined in some other way), cases involving the potential for incarceration, cases
involving actual incarceration, or all criminal cases.” (citing John F. Decker &
Thomas J. Lorigan, Comment, Right to Counsel: The Impact of Gideon v.
Wainwright in the Fifty States, 3 CREIGHTON L. REV. 103, 119–24 (1970)
(describing the post-Gideon landscape in which thirty-one states had extended
the holding of Gideon to cover nonfelonies, in some cases including even traffic
offenses, but in others only involving “serious misdemeanors”)).
117. See id. (stating that post-Gideon cases began to refine the application of
the newly defined constitutional right).
118. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
119. See id. at 31 (“In Gideon v. Wainwright we dealt with a felony trial. But
we did not so limit the need of the accused for a lawyer.”).
120. Id. at 26.
121. See id. at 26 (detailing the facts and procedural history that led to the
writ being issued).
122. King, supra note 25, at 11 (citing Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 36–40).
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crime. 123 Yet, despite the broad language of the majority opinion, 124
the Court stopped short of declaring a categorical right to
appointed counsel in all criminal cases. 125 Although many believed
that the Court would soon recognize such a categorical grant, the
Court instead halted the expansion of the Counsel Clause seven
years later in Scott v. Illinois. 126
In Scott, the petitioner, charged and convicted of shoplifting
merchandise valued at less than $150, was fined $50 after a bench
trial in which he was not represented by counsel. 127 The maximum
penalty that the petitioner faced was “a $500 fine or one year in
jail, or both.”128 On appeal, the petitioner argued that Supreme
Court jurisprudence required the state of Illinois to provide him
with counsel. 129 In affirming the conviction, the Supreme Court
held “that counsel need only be appointed in ‘serious cases,’ which
the Court defined as those cases that resulted in actual
incarceration.” 130 The opinion evidences the Court’s belief that
actual incarceration is a punishment different in kind from
authorized imprisonment or fines, and thus, only a defendant
facing the former is entitled to the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee
of the assistance of counsel. 131
123. See id. (explaining the Supreme Court’s decision to expand the right to
court-appointed counsel beyond felony cases) (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25, 27–29 (1972)).
124. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 33
The requirement of counsel may well be necessary for a fair trial even
in a petty-offense prosecution. We are by no means convinced that legal
and constitutional questions involved in a case that actually leads to
imprisonment even for a brief period are any less complex than when
a person can be sent off for six months or more.
125. See King, supra note 25, at 12 (stating the Supreme Court’s decision not
to grant an all-encompassing right to counsel in criminal case).
126. 440 U.S. 367 (1979); see also King, supra note 25, at 13 (describing the
post-Argersinger environment and the Court’s decision to limit the Counsel
Clause’s reach).
127. See Scott, 440 U.S. at 368 (detailing the factual background of the case).
128. Id.
129. See id. (stating the grounds for the petitioner’s appeal).
130. King, supra note 25, at 13.
131. See Scott, 440 U.S. at 373 (“[W]e believe that . . . actual imprisonment is
a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of
imprisonment . . . [thus] warrant[ing] adoption of actual imprisonment as the line
defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel.”).
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As American jurisprudence currently stands, an indigent
state-court criminal defendant is entitled to counsel only if actual
imprisonment were to follow conviction. 132 Every indigent
defendant facing felony prosecution, “regardless of whether or not
the defendant is sentenced to incarceration,” must be provided
counsel. 133 Each state has different criteria for determining who
qualifies as an indigent criminal defendant entitled to
court-appointed counsel. 134
D. The Right to Counsel of Choice
In Wheat v. United States, 135 the Court expressly recognized
that the Sixth Amendment also protects a criminal defendant’s
choice of counsel. 136 As Eugene Shapiro aptly stated, “[w]hen, in
May of 1988, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the Sixth
Amendment encompassed a criminal defendant’s interest in
retaining counsel of the defendant’s choice, it did so with a tone
often reserved for statements of the obvious.” 137 The petitioner,
charged with participating in a conspiracy to distribute drugs,
sought to be represented by his co-defendants’ attorney. 138 At a
hearing for consideration of the issue, the government argued that
the attorney’s prior representation created a serious conflict of
interest, and, as a result, the petitioner’s request must be
132. See id. at 374 (“[T]he Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments . . . require
only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment
unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in
his defense.”).
133. King, supra note 25, at 11 n.64 (citing Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406,
419 (2007)).
134. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006(A) (2012) (“Each United States district court, with
the approval of the judicial council of the circuit, shall place in operation
throughout the district a plan for furnishing representation for any person
financially unable to obtain adequate representation in accordance with this
section.”).
135. 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
136. See id. at 164 (“The District Court must recognize a presumption in favor
of petitioner’s counsel of choice.”).
137. Eugene L. Shapiro, The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel of Choice: An
Exercise in the Weighing of Unarticulated Values, 43 S.C. L. REV. 345, 345 (1991).
138. See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 155 (detailing the factual background and
petitioner’s request that Eugene Iredale, attorney for petitioner’s co-defendants,
represent him as well).
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denied. 139 The trial court denied the petitioner’s request for
counsel. 140 The petitioner then proceeded to trial, where he was
convicted and thereafter appealed his conviction on the ground
that he was denied his counsel of choice. 141 The Court accepted the
petitioner’s claim that the Sixth Amendment provides for the
disqualification of a retained attorney because of a possible conflict
of interest. 142 The Court devoted little time to discussing the
acceptance of such a right, and instead focused on the scope of that
right “and the process by which the presumption in favor of
defendant’s counsel of choice might be outweighed.” 143
The Court stated that this right was “circumscribed” and
proceeded to discuss the ways in which this right could be
overcome by other interests. 144 For example, the presumption in
favor of counsel of choice is overcome if a defendant seeks an
attorney who is not admitted by the bar, who he cannot afford, or
who declines to represent him. 145 Additionally, “a defendant [may
not] insist on the counsel of an attorney who has a previous or
ongoing relationship with an opposing party, even when the
opposing party is the Government.”146 The opinion articulated a
list of limitations on the right to counsel that evolved into a
balancing test for determining what types of interferences would
be permissible. 147 Wheat requires courts to weigh the particular
facts and interests in each case to determine the strength of a
139. See Shapiro, supra note 137, at 349 (detailing the government’s position
on petitioner’s request for Eugene Iredale’s counsel).
140. See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 157 (stating the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s
request of counsel).
141. See id. (detailing the procedural history of petitioner’s claim that he was
denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice).
142. See Shapiro, supra note 137, at 345 (discussing the Supreme Court’s
acceptance of a right to counsel of choice under the Sixth Amendment).
143. Id.
144. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988) (“The Sixth
Amendment right to choose one’s own counsel is circumscribed in several
important respects.”).
145. See Shapiro, supra note 137, at 347–48 (stating the ways in which a
criminal defendant may not be entitled to his choice of counsel).
146. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159.
147. See Shapiro, supra note 137, at 348 (explaining the practical effect of the
Court’s decision to limit a defendant’s right to choice of counsel in circumstances
where other interests are implicated).
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defendant’s claim for their choice of counsel. 148 Consequently, the
trial court retains discretion to disqualify a defendant’s counsel if
the circumstances warrant it.149 Although Wheat requires a
balancing in favor of a defendant’s choice of counsel against
competing interests, the Court provided little instruction on the
strength of that presumption or how government interests should
be viewed in light of the presumption. 150
As counsel of choice jurisprudence currently stands, there is a
presumption in favor of a criminal defendant’s choice that can be
overcome by the interests of fairness or other conflicting
government interests.151 The Court has recognized the demands of
the court’s calendar as one such relevant government interest. 152
This interest is potentially implicated by an indigent criminal
defendant’s motion to fire currently retained counsel and seek
court-appointed counsel as it could require a continuance of
previously scheduled hearings or trial. Additionally, although not
explicitly stated in the counsel of choice cases, the Government
could attempt to assert an interest in lowering costs when a
criminal defendant who has already personally retained counsel
moves to dismiss said counsel and have the government pay for a
court-appointed attorney.
An important and large subset of criminal defendants do not
enjoy the same right to counsel of choice as do other criminal
defendants: indigent defendants represented by court-appointed

148. See id. (“Wheat seems to require a careful weighing of the particularized
facts and interests in each case.”).
149. See id. (“This weighing process led the Wheat Court to conclude that the
disqualification of counsel was within the trial court’s discretion.”).
150. See id. at 350 (stating the limited instruction provided by the Court in
Wheat regarding how to balance the presumption in favor of the defendant’s
choice and the Government’s interests).
151. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144 (2006) (“[T]he
right to counsel of choice ‘is circumscribed in several important respects.’”
(quoting Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159)).
152. See id. at 152 (“We have recognized a trial court’s wide latitude in
balancing the right to counsel of choice against . . . the demands of its calendar.”
(citing Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1983))).
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counsel from the outset.153 In Morris v. Slappy 154 the Court rejected
the claim that “the Sixth Amendment guarantees a ‘meaningful
relationship’ between an accused and his counsel.” 155 This decision
was in response to a defendant’s desire to substitute his
court-appointed counsel after the two had become “embroiled in
irreconcilable conflict.” 156 The Court stated that effective
assistance of counsel is all that is required by the Sixth
Amendment and found that Mr. Slappy was assisted by an
effective attorney. 157 In short, as the Court later explained, “the
appropriate inquiry focuses on the adversarial process, not on the
accused’s relationship with his lawyer as such. If counsel is a
reasonably effective advocate, he meets constitutional standards
irrespective of his client’s evaluation of his performance.” 158
III. The Conflict of Multiple Rights’ Assertion
The right to hire and fire retained counsel 159 as well as the
right to court-appointed counsel for qualifying indigent
defendants 160 are protected by the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee
153. See Janet C. Hoeffel, Toward a More Robust Right to Counsel of Choice,
44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 545, 528 (2007) (“For indigent defendants, since they have
no right to counsel of choice, a trial court can deny a defendant’s motion to
continue the trial in order to allow his appointed counsel to stay on the case,
thereby serving an ongoing attorney relationship.”). A more recent and
particularly pertinent Supreme Court decision, Gonzalez-Lopez, explicitly states
that “the right to counsel of choice does not extend to defendants who require
counsel to be appointed for them.” Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 151.
154. 461 U.S. 1 (1983).
155. Id. at 14.
156. Id. at 4.
157. See id. at 14
The Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel “would be without substance if it did not include the right to a
meaningful attorney-client relationship,” is without basis in the law.
No authority was cited for this novel ingredient of the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of counsel, and of course none could be.
(citations omitted).
158. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.21 (1984).
159. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147–48 (2006) (“The
right to select counsel of one’s choice . . . has been regarded as the root meaning
of the constitutional guarantee [of the Sixth Amendment].”).
160. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“[I]n our adversary
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of assistance of counsel. 161 Because both rights, as well as several
others, are constitutionally protected under the Sixth Amendment,
courts must know the proper procedure for handling a case when
these two rights are simultaneously asserted by a criminal
defendant.
In 2004, the First Circuit addressed the issue of a criminal
defendant wishing to fire retained counsel and seek
court-appointed counsel. 162 The First Circuit articulated a
standard which required a defendant to show good cause in order
to substitute retained counsel for court-appointed counsel and thus
to enjoy both of their Sixth Amendment rights. 163 Eleven years
later, and without reference to the First Circuit’s opinion, the
Ninth Circuit stated that a criminal defendant has the right to
discharge retained counsel for any reason or for no reason at all
and that the court is then obligated by § 3006A(b) to appoint the
defendant a new attorney to represent the defendant.164 Shortly
thereafter, the Eleventh Circuit followed the Ninth Circuit’s lead
by expressly rejecting the good cause showing required by the First
Circuit. 165 In order to understand the differing circuits’
justifications, it is necessary to take a closer look at each case
contributing to the split, beginning with the First Circuit’s
decision.
system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”).
161. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”).
162. See United States v. Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 2004)
(stating the defendant’s motion to dismiss personally retained counsel and to then
have the court appoint new counsel).
163. See id. at 48 (“A defendant ‘must show that the conflict between lawyer
and client was so profound as to cause a total breakdown in communication,’
preventing an adequate defense.” (quoting United States v. Myers, 294 F.3d 203,
208 (1st Cir. 2002))).
164. See United States v. Brown, 785 F.3d 1337, 1344–46 (9th Cir. 2015)
(stating that a financially qualified criminal defendant has the right to fire
retained counsel and that the court is then obligated by federal law to appoint the
defendant counsel).
165. See United States v. Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d 1267, 1271–72 (11th
Cir. 2016) (“We agree with those courts that have held that a defendant may
discharge his retained counsel without regard to whether he will later request
appointed counsel . . . . We reject the view of the First Circuit, which applied the
standard of good cause in this circumstance.”).
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A. United States v. Mota-Santana
On July 31, 2002, Enrique Mota-Santana was indicted for
“conspiring with two co-defendants to import cocaine and heroin
into the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963 over a two
year period, beginning in late 2000.”166 Initially, Mr.
Mota-Santana refused court-appointed counsel and employed
counsel retained by his family. 167 On December 4, 2002, Mr.
Mota-Santana and his counsel, Raymond Sanchez, reviewed and
accepted a plea agreement offered by the government for him to
plead guilty to Count One of his indictment; the government would
then recommend a particular sentence and dismiss the second
charge. 168
On December 6, 2002, Mr. Mota-Santana submitted a motion
for change of plea and six days later his counsel filed a request to
withdraw as counsel. 169 Mr. Sanchez’s request detailed his
conversations with Mr. Mota-Santana following the entry of the
plea and Mr. Mota-Santana’s dissatisfaction with his lawyer’s
failure to negotiate a better plea.170 Following a change of plea
hearing on December 16, 2002, Mr. Mota-Santana once again told
the court he wished to plead guilty to Count One and that he was
satisfied with his attorney’s services. 171 At this time, “the court
concluded that he was acting ‘voluntarily and with full knowledge

166. Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d at 43.
167. See id. at 44 (discussing the defendant’s history with counsel following
his indictment). Mr. Mota-Santana later replaced his initial lawyer with newly
retained counsel, Raymond Sanchez-Maceira. Id.
168. See id. (stating the details of the December 4, 2002 plea agreement
offered to Mr. Mota-Santana by the government). The plea agreement stipulated
that Mr. Mota-Santana was “satisfied with counsel, that he was familiar with the
rights he was surrendering, that his agreement was voluntary, and that he had
reviewed every part of the agreement with his attorney and understood it.” Id.
169. See id. (stating the events following the accepted plea deal which
culminated in Mr. Sanchez’s request to withdraw as counsel for Mr.
Mota-Santana).
170. See id. (stating Mr. Sanchez’s request to withdraw as counsel and
describing the interactions between himself and Mr. Mota-Santana following the
entry of the plea deal).
171. See id. (“On resumption of the hearing, defendant told the court he had
enough time to consult with his attorney, that he wished to enter a plea of guilty
to Count One, and that he was satisfied with his services.”).
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of the consequences.’” 172 In January 2003, Mr. Mota-Santana filed
a pro se motion to appoint counsel asserting that his family could
no longer afford to pay his counsel’s fees and further detailing his
displeasure with Mr. Sanchez’s services. 173
On February 14, 2003, Mr. Sanchez filed a response to Mr.
Mota-Santana’s motion.174 However, Mr. Sanchez also stated “that
the breakdown in communication between him and his client
threatened the latter’s Sixth Amendment rights and that new
counsel should be appointed.” 175 On February 26, 2003, the district
court denied Mr. Mota-Santana’s motion to appoint counsel. 176 At
the sentencing hearing on April 3, 2003, Mr. Mota-Santana was
sentenced to 120 months in prison. 177
On appeal, Mr. Mota-Santana challenged the court’s failure to
determine if a conflict of interest existed between himself and Mr.
Sanchez after he asked Mr. Sanchez to withdraw and requested
the court appoint new counsel. 178 Mr. Mota-Santana contended
172. Id. at 45 (citation omitted).
173. See id. (“[Mr. Mota-Santana stated] that on December 30 and 31 he had
tried unsuccessfully to call Sanchez, that Sanchez had ‘deceived’ him into signing
a plea agreement that was not fully explained to him, and that he had lost all
confidence in Sanchez.”).
174. See id.
[Mr. Sanchez detailed] that he said paid several visits to defendant;
that he had requested and received considerable discovery; that he had
filed a motion to suppress a tape and had participated in a hearing to
determine its acceptability; that plea negotiations had been
complicated by three factors—defendant's role, drug amounts, and
another case in which supervised release might be jeopardized; and
that defendant was well aware of the plea provisions and had not been
deceived.
Mr. Sanchez stated that his fees had been fully paid and that no further fees were
being charged and further described his efforts in the case and contacts with Mr.
Mota-Santana. See id. (detailing Mr. Sanchez’s required response to Mr.
Mota-Santana’s pro se motion). Mr. Sanchez also explained that he had visited
defendant several times and that the defendant was fully aware of the plea
provisions and had not been deceived. Id.
175. Id.
176. See id. (“On February 26, the court endorsed an order denying the motion
to appoint counsel.”).
177. See id. (detailing the events of Mr. Mota-Santana’s sentencing hearing).
Additionally, at this hearing Mr. Mota-Santana declined the court’s invitation
when asked if there was anything he would like to state to the court. See id.
(describing the events of the sentencing hearing).
178. See id. (articulating the question presented to the First Circuit on
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that this case involved “a per se denial of [his] Sixth Amendment
rights and requires reversal without any obligation to show
prejudice.” 179 Mr. Mota-Santana was unable to persuade the First
Circuit, which found the alleged conflict to be minimal. 180 The
court stated that Mr. Mota-Santana attempted to stretch the
concept of “conflict of interests” beyond its permissible bounds,
when in actuality his relationship with Mr. Sanchez implicated no
more than a mere, unremarkable disagreement. 181 The court also
took issue with Mr. Mota-Santana’s claim that he was entitled to
reversal without an obligation to show prejudice. 182 Consequently,
appeal). Mr. Mota-Santana argues that he accused Mr. Sanchez of failing to
properly represent him and that there had been a complete breakdown in
communications between the two. See id. (describing Mr. Mota-Santana’s
appellate argument). Mr. Mota-Santana further argued that the case contained a
conflict of interest which requires an inquiry to resolve the issue and that the
district court failed to hold such an inquiry, but instead proceeded with the
change of plea hearing. See id. (explaining Mr. Mota-Santana’s argument on
appeal).
179. Id.
180. See id. at 46 (“The alleged conflict . . . was not [an] uncommon type of
disagreement between client and counsel, exacerbated by regret that a more
favorable plea agreement could not somehow have been made.”).
181. See id. (describing the concept of “conflict of interests” and stating that
all relevant cases deal with multiple representation situations where a lawyer
has two or more clients in the same event or transaction).
182. See id. (discussing Mr. Mota-Santana’s reliance on Holloway v.
Arkansas, clarified by Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002), as requiring
reversal “‘only where defense counsel is forced to represent codefendants over his
timely objection, unless the trial court has determined that there is no conflict’”
(quoting Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 168 (2002))). In 2002, the Supreme
Court stated that “a defendant must show a defective, though not necessarily
outcome-affecting, performance by counsel.” Id. The Court also addressed courts
of appeal that have applied the required judicial inquiry for conflict of interest
cases to situations in which representation of the defendant implicates counsel’s
person or financial interests rather than joint representation. See id. (stating the
Court’s policy with regard to judicial inquiries in varying cases of conflict of
interests). The Court noted that such an expansive application of the inquiry
requirement is not expressly required by applicable case law. See id. (noting that
the language of Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, (1980), which requires judicial
inquiry into conflicts of interest cases, does not require or even support such a
broad understanding of conflict). The First Circuit explained that if it were to
treat disagreements between attorney and client in the same manner as conflicts
arising from multiple representation, any unsuccessful criminal defendants
would likely attempt to produce some disagreement with their counsel. See id.
(considering the practical implications of permitting automatic reversal for
criminal defendants who can show that their counsel’s representation of them
implicates counsel’s personal or financial interests).
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the court declined Mr. Mota-Santana’s proposal to treat this case
as presenting notice of a potential conflict of interest necessitating
a special inquiry and potential reversal. 183
The court framed Mr. Mota-Santana’s case as presenting two
distinct actions of the court: “its refusal to allow Sanchez to
withdraw and its refusal to appoint substitute counsel.” 184 The
court stated that if Mr. Mota-Santana’s only argument was the
appropriateness of the district court’s refusal to permit Mr.
Sanchez to withdraw, then there might have been a legitimate
question. 185 “But here the two actions merge,” as Mr.
Mota-Santana was unable to pay to retain other private counsel,
but still sought court-appointed counsel. 186 In evaluating the
sufficiency of the district court’s inquiry, the First Circuit
stipulated that judicial inquiries need not amount to a formal
hearing, but instead merely require satisfaction of a number of
stated objectives.187 The court analogized this case to United States
v. Allen 188 and stated that “‘[g]ood cause for substitution of counsel
cannot be determined solely according to the subjective standard
183. See id. (stating the court’s refusal to treat Mr. Mota-Santana’s case as
one containing a legitimate notice of conflicts of interest). The court further stated
that differences between a client and their counsel can be so deep and pervasive
that effective legal assistance would be impaired to require relief from the court,
but that this is not one of those case. See id. (qualifying Mr. Mota-Santana’s claim
of conflict of interests in the grander scheme of client-attorney conflict).
184. Id. at 46–47.
185. See id. (articulating the court’s primary problem with Mr.
Mota-Santana’s appellate claim). The court explained that if Mr. Mota-Santana
challenged only the district court’s refusal to allow Mr. Sanchez to withdraw then
it would be controlled by United States v. Woodard, 291 F.3d 95 (1st Cir. 2002).
See id. (“As we said in United States v. Woodard . . . a defendant is not ordinarily
dependent on the court’s permission to replace retained counsel.”).
186. Id.
187. See id.
The appellate court should consider several factors, including the
timeliness of the motion, the adequacy of the court’s inquiry into the
defendant’s complaint, and whether the conflict between the defendant
and his counsel was so great that is resulted in a total lack of
communication preventing an adequate defense.
The court set aside the timeliness issue as not having been advanced as a
challenge and proceeds with the suggested analysis. See id. (disregarding the
consideration of timeliness and proceeding with evaluating Mr. Mota-Santana’s
reason for dissatisfaction).
188. 789 F.2d 90 (1st Cir. 1986).
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of what the defendant perceives,’” thus articulating the
requirement of an objective “good cause” showing.189 In its analysis
the court noted Mr. Mota-Santana’s initial reason for
dissatisfaction, but qualified that reason as being inadequate for
purposes of determining that new counsel ought to be appointed. 190
The court further responded to each of Mr. Mota-Santana’s
complaints and accusations by discounting or disproving each. 191
Following its analysis the court concluded that if there was a
breakdown in communication between Mr. Mota-Santana and Mr.
Sanchez then it was the doing of the defendant.192 The court
explained that “a defendant cannot compel a change to [sic] counsel
by the device of refusing to talk with his lawyer,” and thus Mr.
Mota-Santana did not have a valid claim concerning breakdown in
communication. 193 Finally, the court addressed whether the
disagreements at issue were likely to preclude effective legal
assistance in the defense. 194 The court concluded that the work of
Mr. Sanchez was practically at its end and the only remaining
work would be that of appellate work, a service beyond the scope
of the request for substitute counsel.195
189. United States v. Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting
Allen, 789 F.2d at 93).
190. See id.
[T]he initial reason for dissatisfaction [was] . . . that he thought
counsel should have obtained a more favorable plea agreement offer
from the government . . . . [but] “[t]he mere fact that a defense attorney
and his client disagreed about the advisability of a plea does not justify
appointing new counsel.”
(quoting United States v. Genao, 281 F.3d 305, 313 (1st Cir. 2002)).
191. See id. at 47–48. (discounting Mr. Mota-Santana’s accusation that Mr.
Sanchez deceived him, the complaint that Mr. Sanchez was unavailable and
unreachable, and the assertion that Mr. Mota-Santana and Mr. Sanchez
experienced a total breakdown in communication). The court stated that to prove
a complete breakdown in communication “a defendant ‘must show that the
conflict between lawyer and client was so profound as to cause a total breakdown
in communication,’ preventing an adequate defense.” Id. at 48.
192. See id. (stating the court’s belief that if a breakdown occurred, it was the
doing of Mr. Mota-Santana).
193. Id.
194. See id. (introducing the court’s final inquiry into Mr. Mota-Santana’s
appellate case).
195. See id. (concluding that Mr. Mota-Santana was not deprived of effective
legal assistance because Mr. Sanchez had already finished all the legal work he
needed to complete).
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In conclusion, the First Circuit determined that the district
court gave adequate attention to Mr. Mota-Santana’s motions,
made appropriate inquiries into the causes and merits of the
complaints, and “was well within its discretion in refusing to
appoint new counsel.” 196 Due to Mr. Mota-Santana’s inability to
supply a good cause rationale for his request to terminate retained
counsel and seek court-appointed counsel, he was denied reversal
of his conviction and the opportunity to have his counsel of choice.
B. United States v. Brown
Eleven years later, in United States v. Brown, 197 the Ninth
Circuit addressed an indigent criminal defendant’s request to
substitute retained counsel for court-appointed counsel, and the
court decided the case without reference to the First Circuit’s
decision in United States v. Mota-Santana. 198 In fact, the court
began its opinion directly contradicting the First Circuit’s decision
by stating: “United States v. Rivera-Corona . . . held that an
indigent criminal defendant need not establish a conflict with his
attorney amounting to the constructive denial of counsel as a
prerequisite to substituting appointed counsel for his retained
attorney.” 199
The defendant, Mr. Brown, was charged with one count each
of advertising child pornography, receiving child pornography, and
possessing child pornography. 200 Two and a half weeks prior to the
start of trial, Mr. Brown’s retained counsel filed a motion to
withdraw and for the court to substitute a court-appointed public
defender to the case.201 Subsequently, the district court held a
196. Id.
197. 785 F.3d 1337 (9th Cir. 2015).
198. Id.; United States v. Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2004).
199. Brown, F.3d at 1340 (citing United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d
976, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010).
200. See id. (describing the charges against Mr. Brown).
201. See id. at 1341 (stating the retained defense counsel’s motion to
withdraw from the case prior to trial). Mr. Brown’s lawyer stated there were
“‘strained’ communications and an ‘actual conflict of interest’ with Brown.” Id.
Mr. Brown’s counsel further informed the court that Mr. Brown wished for
counsel to withdraw and attached an email in which Mr. Brown had specifically
requested the withdrawal and stated his intention to seek appointed counsel. See
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hearing on Mr. Brown’s counsel’s motion to withdraw. 202 Following
conversations with both Mr. Brown and his counsel, the court
denied the motion. 203 Mr. Brown was convicted at trial and “filed a
motion for judgment of acquittal or for a new trial, based in part
on the court’s denial of his attorney’s motion to withdraw.”204
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis of the appeal by
distinguishing Mr. Brown’s case from that of an indigent criminal
defendant seeking substitute counsel for his current
court-appointed counsel. 205 Mr. Brown, “who has hired his own
id. (detailing Mr. Brown’s lawyer’s motion to withdraw from representation).
202. Id. The hearing began when Mr. Brown’s counsel informed the court of
the extreme difference in opinion as to how to handle the case between himself
and Mr. Brown. Id. The trial judge asked Mr. Brown if he had an objection to his
lawyer’s motion to withdrawal and he indicated that he did not. Id. The judge
proceeded to explain that if it decided to appoint a public defender then it would
require a continuance of the trial so that the new counsel could be brought up to
speed. Id. The judge further stated that he found fault with counsel’s late filing
of the motion and the faulty base of the motion, specifically the disagreement over
payment and an inability, or unwillingness, of counsel to prepare for trial. Id.
Counsel responded that the disagreement was not over payment and he was
ready to proceed to trial, at which time the judge engaged Mr. Brown. Id. Mr.
Brown advised the judge that defense counsel was never receptive to Mr. Brown’s
desire to present a defense, but instead focused on a potential plea deal. Id. at
1342. The judge again addressed Mr. Brown’s counsel and reminded him of Mr.
Brown’s control of the defense, restricted by counsel’s ethical duties. Id.
203. See id. at 1343 (denying Mr. Brown’s counsel’s motion to withdraw). The
judge explained to Mr. Brown that his lawyer was well qualified, that the case
was prepared for trial, and that the court would permit the defense extra time
before trial if need be. Id. Further, the judge explained to Mr. Brown that having
paid counsel $50,000, he could not expect nearly as good a defense if the court
were to appoint a public defender. Id.
204. Id. The appeal followed Mr. Brown’s sentencing, during which he was
sentenced to “concurrent 180-month sentences on each of the advertising,
transportation, and receipt counts, and a concurrent 180-month sentence for the
possession account.” Id.
205. See id. (stating that when the court has appointed an attorney for an
indigent criminal defendant, the defendant does not have a right to any specific
lawyer appointed and paid for by the court, but rather a right to effective counsel).
The court further explained that when an indigent defendant represented by
counsel seeks appointment of new counsel the inquiry is “when the conflict
between client and counsel is so extreme as to constitute a ‘constructive denial of
counsel’ altogether.” Id. (quoting United States v. River-Corona, 618 F.3d 976,
979 (9th Cir. 2010)). Such an inquiry involves consideration of the timeliness of
the motion and the extent of resulting inconvenience or delay, the adequacy of the
district court’s inquiry into the motion, and whether the conflict between the
counsel and client was so great that it impaired an adequate defense (good cause);
these are the inquiries that the district court made in Mr. Brown’s case. Id.
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attorney ‘has a different right, independent and distinct from the
right to effective counsel, to be represented by the attorney of his
choice.’” 206 The court stated that Mr. Brown’s right to counsel of his
choice is the core of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee and denial
of this right does not depend on the quality of representation that
Mr. Brown received. 207 Although the right to counsel of choice is
not absolute, generally a defendant will be permitted to have
counsel of his choice unless a different result is necessitated by
“‘purposes inherent in the fair, efficient, and orderly
administration of justice.’” 208 The court clarified that the degree of
conflict analysis employed by the district court is inappropriate
when the court considers a defendant’s motion to discharge his
retained counsel and to be represented by court-appointed
counsel. 209 Instead, this right implicates Mr. Brown’s right to
counsel of choice. 210 To be sure, this is not the same right to counsel
of choice that a defendant enjoys if they seek to replace retained
counsel with different retained counsel, but rather the right to a
court-appointed lawyer in lieu of currently retained counsel. 211 In
this context, Mr. Brown’s right to counsel of choice meant that he
had a right to fire his retained lawyer for any or no reason.212
206. Id. (quoting United States v. Mendez-Sanchez, 563 F.3d 935, 979 (9th
Cir. 2009)).
207. See id. at 1344 (describing the importance of the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel of choice stated in Gonzalez-Lopez).
208. Id. (quoting United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir.
2010)).
209. See id. (stating that a defendant’s motion to substitute court-appointed
counsel for retained counsel does not require an inquiry into conflict between the
counsel and their defendant).
210. See id. (stating that Mr. Brown’s motion to substitute counsel implicates
his qualified right to counsel of choice protected by the Sixth Amendment).
211. See id. (qualifying the right to counsel of choice for indigent defendants
seeking court-appointed counsel as substitute counsel for retained counsel).
212. See id. (explaining that an indigent criminal defendant has discretion to
fire their retained counsel based on the right to counsel of choice). The
Government argued that United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976 (9th Cir.
2010) did not control this case because the defense attorney there involved had
demanded additional legal fees. Id. The court corrected the Government:
“[Rivera-Corona] considered, in general, ‘the standard for considering a criminal
defendant’s motion to discharge his privately retained counsel and to proceed
with a different, court-appointed lawyer instead,’ and concluded that, under those
circumstances, the defendant enjoys a Sixth Amendment right to discharge his
retained counsel.” Id. (quoting Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d at 977–81).
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The court separated the actions implicated in Mr. Brown’s
case:
When a court denies a motion to substitute appointed for
retained counsel, as the district court did in this case, it is really
deciding two issues. The first, whether the defendant
may discharge the attorney whom he retained, implicates
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice, as discussed
above. But the court ruling on such a motion is, at the same
time, also considering a request for appointment of
counsel. And, while a criminal defendant's right to appointed
counsel of course does have a constitutional aspect, in federal
court the question whether counsel should be appointed is
governed, first and foremost, by the [Criminal Justice Act], 18
U.S.C. § 3006A.213

Clearly Mr. Brown’s case involved intertwined issues, the crux of
which was whether he would be permitted to fire retained
counsel. 214 If the Ninth Circuit permits Mr. Brown to fire his
retained counsel then the Criminal Justice Act requires that the
court appoint him counsel unless he wishes to proceed pro se. 215
The government maintained that the court needed to consider
several factors, including the magnitude of the conflict or break in
communication between the lawyer and client. 216 The court framed
this proposal as the government seeking to add a prerequisite to
Mr. Brown’s constitutional right to discharge his retained
counsel—the court rejected the prerequisite. 217 The Ninth Circuit
213. Id. at 1344–45 (citations omitted).
214. See id. at 1345 (explaining the primary issue implicating Mr. Brown’s
constitutional rights).
215. See id. (stating that if Mr. Brown is permitted to discharge his retained
counsel, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b) requires the court to appoint counsel unless he
wishes to exercise his right to represent himself). The Criminal Justice Act
provides that “‘[i]n every case in which a person entitled to
representation . . . appears without counsel . . . the court, if satisfied after
appropriate inquiry that the person is financially unable to obtain counsel, shall
appoint counsel to represent him’ unless that right is waived.” Id. (quoting
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b) (2012)).
216. See id. (stating the Government’s proposed factors for consideration in
determining whether a defendant may substitute appointed for retained counsel).
217. See id. at 1346 (“[T]he government would have us hold that,
notwithstanding Brown’s constitutional right to discharge his lawyer, the
restrictive extent-of-conflict analysis governs whether a replacement is
appointed. We disagree.”). The court further stated that the proposed relevant
factors were “essentially identical to the extent-of-conflict analysis applicable to
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again referred to Rivera-Corona and stated: “[w]here, as here, the
right to retained counsel of choice is implicated, Rivera-Corona
specifically held that ‘the extent-of-conflict review is
Instead,
Rivera-Corona
answers
the
inappropriate.’” 218
constitutional question of how and when an indigent defendant
may fire retained counsel and substitute court-appointed counsel:
“‘for any reason,’ subject to only the orderly administration of
justice qualification.” 219 Mr. Brown is not required to make any
showing or comply with judicially-created requirements in order to
discharge retained counsel and then receive court-appointed
counsel required by the Criminal Justice Act. 220
The Ninth Circuit supported its holding that the district court
abused its discretion in denying Mr. Brown’s motion to discharge
his retained counsel by reframing the issue as one of criminal
defendants’ rights. 221 The district court focused on the attorney’s
reasons for the motion to withdraw, but this motion was primarily
about Mr. Brown trying to fire his lawyer. 222 Instead, “where, as
here, it is apparent that the defendant, not the attorney, instigated
the withdrawal motion, the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights
should trump whatever concerns the court has about the lawyer’s
motives.”223 Mr. Brown’s complaints about his counsel concerned:
replacement of one appointed counsel by another” as in Martel v. Clair, 132 S. Ct.
1276 (2012). Id. (citing Martel, 132 S. Ct. at 1287).
218. Id. (quoting United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir.
2010)).
219. Id. (quoting Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d at 980).
220. See id. (stating that Mr. Brown need not satisfy a showing before
receiving permission to discharge retain counsel and be appointed counsel under
18 U.S.C. § 3006(A)).
221. See id. at 1347 (stating the court’s holding that the district court abused
its discretion in denying Mr. Brown’s motion).
222. See id. (describing the district court’s error in dedicating the motions
hearing to the attorney’s reasons for withdrawing from the case when it ought to
have focused on Mr. Brown’s rights). The court stated that when the district court
considered the motion to withdraw their “responsibility was not to ensure a fair
attorney-client relationship or to supervise the conduct of the lawyer,” and stated
that those considerations “are relevant and important . . . when a court considers
a lawyer’s motion to withdraw.” Id. (citing Brandon v. Blech, 560 F.3d 536, 537–
39 (6th Cir. 2009)).
223. Id. The district court was aware that Mr. Brown initiated the withdrawal
motion based on the email attached to the motion, from Mr. Brown to his counsel
regarding his desire to discharge counsel, and the subsequent statements made
by Mr. Brown during the motions hearing. Id.
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(1) a difference in opinion as to how the case should be handled and
a lack of trust; (2) dissatisfaction with the infrequent contact
between the two; and (3) financial tensions resulting from Mr.
Brown’s difficulty collecting money for the last payment.224
The court stated that any one of these reasons was more than
sufficient to support Mr. Brown’s desire to discharge retained
counsel. 225 In fact, Mr. Brown’s reasons for wishing to discharge
his retained counsel were not the court’s concern at all—“[h]e had
the right to ‘fire his retained . . . lawyer . . . for any reason or [for]
no reason.’” 226 The court further states that “[o]nly affirmative
interference with the ‘fair, efficient and orderly administration of
justice,’ could have justified an order that Brown could not
discharge his lawyer.” 227 The court concluded, after review of the
district court’s record concerning reasons to deny Mr. Brown’s
motion to promote the administration of justice, that no such
reasons existed. 228 The court further concluded that “[Mr.] Brown’s
motion to discharge his retained counsel should have been
granted,” and “[a]s [Mr.] Brown met the financial requirements for
an appointed lawyer, he was entitled to one . . . .” 229
224. See id. at 1348 (summarizing Mr. Brown’s complaints addressed briefly
at the district court’s motions hearing).
225. See id. (“In the context of the constitutional right to discharge a retained
lawyer, any of these concerns was more than sufficient.”).
226. Id. (quoting United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir.
2010) (alteration in original omitted) (emphasis added)).
227. Id. (quoting United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir.
2010) (citation omitted)). The Government suggested in its briefing that the
district court denied Mr. Brown’s motion because of the possibility of delay
associated with allowing discharge and appointment of new counsel, a rationale
relevant to the “fair, efficient and orderly administration of justice.” Id. at 1349.
The court conceded that the district court has broad discretion to balance the right
to discharge retained counsel with the demands of the court calendar. Id. Despite
this discretion, the court found that the district court in this case did not deny the
motion based on time constraint nor would that rationale qualify as an
“administration-of-justice” basis for the denial of Mr. Brown’s right to discharge
retained counsel. Id. The court offered three reasons for this finding: (1) the
district court never justified its denial of the motion by concern for its calendar;
(2) the district court’s offer to continue the case directly contradicts the suggestion
that it was denied to avoid delay; and (3) the district court did not attempt to
determine how long newly appointed counsel would need to be prepared for trial.
Id.
228. See id. at 1350 (concluding that the district court did not have any
administration-of-justice rationale for denying Mr. Brown’s motion).
229. Id.
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In terms of remedy, the court stated that the denial of Mr.
Brown’s right to counsel of choice qualified as a structural error,
“requiring that convictions be vacated even without a showing of
prejudice.” 230 Therefore, the denial of Mr. Brown’s motion
constituted denial of his right to counsel of choice and the court
vacated his convictions. 231 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Brown
not to require indigent criminal defendants to satisfy an objective
good cause showing prior to dismissal of retained counsel provided
the foundation for the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States
v. Jimenez-Antunez 232 just one year later.233 The Eleventh Circuit
relied heavily on Brown, in addition to several lower court
decisions, in concluding that Mr. Jimenez-Antunez did not need to
show good cause in order to substitute appointed counsel for his
retained counsel. 234
C. United States v. Jimenez-Antunez
On June 4, 2013, Gabriel Jimenez-Antunez was indicted for
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500
grams of methamphetamine, possession of 500 grams of
methamphetamine with intent to distribute, conspiracy to commit
money laundering, and illegal reentry after deportation. 235
Following the indictment, Mr. Joshi entered a notice of appearance
as Mr. Jimenez-Antunez’s retained counsel. 236 On October 24,
230. Id. (citing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006)).
231. See id. (“Accordingly, because Brown’s motion to substitute counsel
should have been granted, Brown was denied his right to counsel of choice and
we must vacate his convictions.”).
232. 820 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2016).
233. See id. at 1271 (citing affirmatively Brown as support for the court’s
decision not to require a good cause showing).
234. See id. (stating that an indigent criminal defendant, while not seeking
counsel of choice is constitutionally permitted to fire his retained counsel for any
reason or for no reason at all).
235. See id. at 1269 (stating the grand jury’s indictments of Mr.
Jimenez-Antunez).
236. See id. (describing the inception of Mr. Joshi and Mr. Jimenez-Antunez’s
relationship). With the help of Mr. Joshi, Mr. Jimenez-Antunez “negotiated a plea
agreement with the government and pleaded guilty to the two conspiracy
charges.” Id. Mr. Jimenez-Antunez’s sentencing hearing was set for January 6,
2015. Id. at 1270.
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2014, Mr. Jimenez-Antunez sent a letter to Mr. Joshi expressing
his desire to discharge Mr. Joshi and intention to seek
court-appointed counsel. 237 Thereafter, Mr. Joshi filed a motion to
withdraw as defense counsel and advised the court of Mr.
Jimenez-Antunez’s intention to substitute court-appointed
counsel. 238 Upon hearing Mr. Jimenez-Antunez’s complaints in
court, “[t]he district court concluded that [Mr. Jimenez-Antunez]
‘[had] been afforded effective counsel’ and denied the motion.” 239
Mr. Jimenez-Antunez was sentenced to two terms—one 300-month
sentence and one 240-month sentence—to be served concurrently
and thereafter appealed.240
Mr. Jimenez-Antunez’s appeal presented a question of first
impression for the Eleventh Circuit: “whether a criminal
defendant must show good cause to dismiss retained counsel if the
defendant intends to seek appointed counsel.” 241 The court
specified that it was reviewing the district court’s denial of the
motion to withdraw as counsel for abuse of discretion. 242
237. See id. at 1269–70 (“[Mr. Jimenez-Antunez] wrote, ‘I do not want your
services anymore, and I do not want you to represent me anymore; so the Judge
can appoint another counsel for me, and so the Judge may know my reasons and
my motives why I am asking for this change.’”).
238. See id. at 1270 (detailing Mr. Joshi’s motion to withdraw as defense
counsel). In response to Mr. Joshi’s motion to withdraw, the district court
rescheduled the sentencing hearing for December 14, 2014. Id. At the beginning
of the hearing, the district court reviewed Mr. Joshi’s motion to withdraw and
heard statements from Mr. Jimenez-Antunez about the disagreement over how
to handle the case, feelings of coercion, and lack of communication between
himself and the lawyer. Id. The district court responded to each of Mr.
Jimenez-Antunez’s complaints in turn: (1) it suspected that Mr. Jimenez-Antunez
was disappointed with the guideline range, not the way the case was handled;
(2) there was no evidence that Mr. Joshi had coerced Mr. Jimenez-Antunez into
pleading guilty; and (3) Mr. Joshi must have had more recent contact with his
client than Mr. Jimenez-Antunez was giving him credit considering they had
reviewed the presentence investigation report together just three months before.
Id.
239. Id.
240. See id. (stating the sentencing outcome that led to the appeal to the
Eleventh Circuit).
241. Id. at 1269.
242. See id. at 1270 (stating the standard of review (quoting Brown v. United
States, 720 F.3d 1316, 1325 (11th Cir. 2013))). The court further stipulated that
“‘[a] district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard,
applies the law in an unreasonable or incorrect manner, follows improper
procedures in making a determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly
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The court began its analysis by distinguishing between the
standards that apply to indigent criminal defendants’ requests to
substitute appointed counsel—requiring a showing of good cause—
and those that apply to criminal defendants who do not require
Mr.
appointed
counsel—a
near-absolute
right. 243
Jimenez-Antunez’s appeal required the court to determine which
of these two standards applied to a defendant who moves to replace
retained counsel with appointed counsel. 244 The court addressed
the issue by considering the timeline of requests; Mr.
Jimenez-Antunez first requested to discharge his retained
counsel. 245 The court stated that Mr. Jimenez-Antunez’s “right to
choose counsel is incomplete if it does not include the right to
discharge counsel that [he] no longer chooses.”246 This is true even
if the indigent defendant’s decision to discharge retained counsel
requires the court to appoint counsel to take his place. 247
erroneous.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Toll, 804 F.3d 1344, 1353 (11th Cir.
2015)).
243. See id. at 1270–71 (distinguishing standards that apply to different
subsets of criminal defendants). In doing so, the court recognized the importance
of the Sixth Amendment guarantee to counsel of choice. Id. (citing United States
v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147–48 (2006)). For criminal defendants who do
not require appointed counsel, they may substitute different retained counsel
“‘regardless of the quality of the representation he received,’” qualified only by not
interfering with the “‘fair, orderly and effective administration of the courts.’” Id.
at 1271 (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148 (2006);
United States v. Koblitz, 803 F.2d 1523, 1528 (11th Cir. 1986)). Alternatively,
“[a]n indigent criminal defendant who seeks appointed counsel ‘does not have a
right to have a particular lawyer represent him nor to demand a different
appointed lawyer except for good cause.’” Id. (quoting Thomas v. Wainwright, 767
F.2d 738, 742 (11th Cir. 1985)). Good cause exists where the attorney and client
experience “a fundamental problem, ‘such as a conflict of interest, a complete
breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an
apparently unjust verdict.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Garey, 540 F.3d 1253,
1263 (11th Cir. 2008)).
244. See id. (stating the root of the issue presented to the court).
245. See id. (“This appeal requires that we decide which standard applies
when a defendant moves to replace retained counsel with appointed counsel. And
the order of that sequence supplies the answer.”).
246. Id.
247. See id. (“[W]hen an indigent defendant has exercised the right to
dispense with a retained lawyer, the right to effective representation . . . might
require that appointed counsel take his place.”). The court elaborated, “[b]ecause
a defendant who moves to dismiss his retained counsel maintains the right to
counsel of choice, a district court cannot require the defendant to show good
cause.” Id.
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The court proceeded to expressly affirm the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in United States v. Brown. 248 Additionally, the court cited
several other lower court decisions that have held that an indigent
criminal defendant “who seeks to discharge retained counsel and
have the court appoint counsel may do so unless the substitution
would delay court proceedings, prejudice the parties, or disrupt
‘the orderly process of justice.’” 249 Rejecting the view of the First
Circuit, the court stated that the First Circuit incorrectly conflated
the right to counsel of choice and the right to effective counsel when
in actuality the rights are distinct. 250
The court explained the correct procedure for addressing a
motion to withdraw:
[B]efore granting a motion to dismiss retained counsel, a
district court must determine that the criminal defendant
either will be represented by counsel or had made a knowing
and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. If a defendant
intends to move the court to appoint counsel, the court should
determine whether the defendant is eligible for appointed
counsel. Even when a district court is assured that a defendant
248. United States v. Brown, 785 F.3d 1337 (9th Cir. 2015). The court cited
favorably the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that such a request, to dismiss retained
counsel and substitute appointed counsel, implicates the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel of choice and therefore, courts cannot require a defendant to meet an
additional threshold showing of good cause. Id.
249. United States v. Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d 1267, 1271–72 (11th Cir.
2016) (quoting Dixon v. Owens, 865 P.2d 1250, 1252 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993);
accord People v. Ortiz, 800 P.2d 547, 555 (Cal. 1990)). The court in
Jimenez-Antunez further cited several state intermediate courts that have
adopted similar approaches to an indigent criminal defendant’s motion of this
sort. See People v. Abernathy, 926 N.E.2d 435, 440–44 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010)
(discussing the denial of Mr. Abernathy’s motion to discharge retained counsel
and seek court-appointed counsel and concluding that the trial court erred by
denying the defendant’s right to counsel of choice); People v. Munsey, 232 P.3d
113, 126–27 (Colo. App. 2009) (detailing the denial of Ms. Munsey’s motion to
discharge retained counsel, distinguishing her situation from that of an indigent
defendant dissatisfied with appointed counsel, and concluding that the trial court
erred in denying her right to counsel of choice); State v. Barber, 206 P.3d 1223,
1234–36 (Utah Ct. App. 2009) (identifying the unique situation presented by a
request to discharge retained counsel and seek appointed counsel and
determining that Mr. Barber was not required to offer any explanation for his
motion to dismiss privately retained counsel and seek appointed counsel).
250. See id. at 1272 (“[The First Circuit’s] decision conflates the two rights at
issue, contrary to the later explanation by the Supreme Court of the United States
in Gonzalez-Lopez that the rights are distinct.” (citing United States v.
Gonzalez-Lopez, 540 U.S. 140, 148 (2006))).
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will have representation or has waived the assistance of
counsel, a court may still deny a motion to substitute retained
counsel if it will interfere with the “fair, orderly, and effective
administration of the courts.”251

Here, the appellate court found that the district court incorrectly
considered Mr. Joshi’s performance, an inquiry relevant only to
Mr. Jimenez-Antunez’s right to effective assistance of counsel, not
his right to counsel of choice.252 Further, the district court provided
no reason why granting the motion would have interfered with the
effective administration of the courts. 253 The court concluded that
the district court’s denial of the motion after application of the
incorrect standard was reversible error, vacated Mr.
Jimenez-Antunez’s convictions, and remanded the case for further
proceedings. 254 The Eleventh Circuit’s express support of the Ninth
Circuit’s procedure—and condemnation of the First Circuit’s
procedure—demonstrates a clear disagreement regarding how the
constitutional right to counsel of choice should be treated and how
such motions ought to be handled.
IV. Argument for Adopting a Two-Part Motions Analysis:
Highlighting the Importance of the Sixth Amendment Guarantees
These conflicting standards for addressing motions to
substitute retained counsel for appointed counsel create confusion
and uncertainty for indigent criminal defendants, who are among
the most vulnerable individuals in society. 255 Aside from the
importance of providing a clear protocol for the benefit of these
251. Id. (quoting United States v. Koblitz, 803 F.2d 1523, 1528 (11th Cir.
1986)) (internal citations omitted).
252. See id. (stating the error of the district court in considering Mr. Joshi’s
performance in the motion to withdraw).
253. See id. (“The district court offered no reasons why granting the motion
would have interfered with the fair, orderly, and effective administration of the
courts . . . .”). The court further explained that it could infer no such reason from
the record. Id. at 1273.
254. See id. at 1273 (detailing the court’s conclusion).
255. See Michael S. Greco, Court Access Should Not Be Rationed, A.B.A.J.,
Dec. 2005, at 1, 6 (discussing indigent criminal defendants and stating that “[t]he
importance of ensuring access to legal services and to justice for the most
vulnerable in society cannot be overstated”).
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indigent defendants, uniformity is critical for the integrity of the
judicial system. 256
After Mota-Santana, the First Circuit would require the
hypothetical “William Defendant” to provide the district court with
a good cause rationale to substitute appointed counsel for retained
counsel. 257 Further, the First Circuit incorrectly insists this case
presents a question concerning the effectiveness of Mr.
Mota-Santana’s lawyer, when in actuality it implicates a question
concerning Mr. Mota-Santana’s right to counsel of choice. 258 Mr.
Sanchez’s motion to withdraw as counsel for Mr. Mota-Santana
requires an analysis of the latter’s right to counsel of choice, a
phrase not mentioned and a concept barely addressed in the
opinion. 259 Instead, the court continued with the district court’s
analysis into conflict of interest and stated that United States v.
Allen controlled. 260 Yet, Allen is readily distinguishable from Mr.
Mota-Santana’s case.261
256. See Evan H. Caminker, Precedents and Prediction: The Forward-Looking
Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 40 (1994) (“[U]niform
interpretation of federal law helps to secure popular respect for judicial authority.
Federal courts depend on the perceived legitimacy of their enterprise for their
authority over other government actors and the general public.”).
257. See United States v. Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 2004)
(requiring good cause for substitution of counsel).
258. See id. at 45 (stating the appellate issue and proceeding to analyze the
district court’s inquiry into the alleged conflict between Mr. Mota-Santana and
his lawyer).
259. See id. at 46
In the instant case, there are two actions of the court at issue: its
refusal to allow Sanchez to withdraw and its refusal to appoint
substitute counsel. Were the only issue that of the appropriateness of
the court’s refusal to permit withdrawal, Sanchez having been retained
privately, there might be some question. As we said in United States v.
Woodard . . . a defendant is not ordinarily dependent on the court’s
permission to replace retained counsel. But here the two actions
merge . . . .
(citing United States v. Woodard, 291 F.3d 95, 107 (1st. Cir. 2002)).
260. See Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d at 47 (“We find ourselves in the same
situation as in Allen: ‘Good cause for substitution of counsel cannot be determined
solely according to the subjective standard of what the defendant perceives.’”
(quoting United States v. Allen, 789 F.2d 90, 93 (1st Cir. 1986))).
261. See United States v. Allen, 789 F.2d 90, 91 (1st Cir. 1986) (discussing Mr.
Allen’s appeal from the district court’s denial of his motion to substitute different
appointed counsel for current appointed counsel). Norman Allen appealed from a
conviction on charges involving the possession of marijuana. Id. Mr. Allen had
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The First Circuit’s ill-founded reliance on Allen caused the
court to conflate the standards to be applied to indigent criminal
defendants seeking to substitute appointed counsel for current
appointed counsel with that of indigent criminal defendants
seeking substitute appointed counsel for retained counsel. 262 The
Eleventh Circuit addressed the necessary distinction twelve years
later in United States v. Jimenez-Antunez. 263 The necessity of this
distinction is more apparent if the requests presented in defense
counsel’s motion to withdraw are treated separately, instead of
understood as a singular request. 264 Had the First Circuit chosen
to treat these requests separately, the first question would have
been whether Mr. Mota-Santana was permitted to discharge
retained counsel. 265 The right to discharge retained counsel is an

been initially appointed Mr. Owen Walker, a federal defender, to serve as his
counsel. Id. Five months following Mr. Walker’s appointment, Mr. Allen wrote a
letter to the court describing his dissatisfaction with his lawyer and belief that if
he had a proper defense he would prove his innocence. Id. Mr. Allen never filed a
motion for leave to withdraw or substitute counsel. Id. at 91–92. The court
understood Mr. Allen’s subsequent comments at the pre-trial colloquy to be a
request for a continuance and denied the motion. Id. On appeal, Mr. Allen argued
that his Sixth Amendment right was violated by the district court’s failure to
adequately inquire into his request for substitute counsel. Id. The First Circuit
stated that “[a]s an indigent defendant, appellant did have the right to be
represented by counsel, but he did not have a right to have a particular lawyer
represent him, nor to demand a different appointed lawyer except for good cause.”
Id. (citations omitted).
262. See Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d at 47 (1st Cir. 2004) (analogizing the case
to the issue presented in Allen).
263. See United States v. Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d 1267, 1270–71 (11th
Cir. 2016) (distinguishing between the standards that apply to an indigent
criminal defendant who seeks alternative appointed counsel and an indigent
criminal defendant who seeks substitute appointed counsel for retained counsel).
264. Compare Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d at 47–48 (“In the instant case, there
are two actions of the course at issue . . . [b]ut here the two actions merge . . . .”),
with United States v. Brown, 785 F.3d 1337, 1343 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[A] defendant
who has hired his own attorney ‘has a different right, independent and distinct
from the right to effective counsel, to be represented by the attorney of his choice.’”
(quoting United States v. Mendez-Sanchez, 563 F.3d 935, 979 (9th Cir. 2009))),
and Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d at 1271 (‘This appeal requires that we decide
which standard applies when a defendant moves to replace retained counsel with
appointed counsel. And the order of that sequence supplies the answer.”).
265. See United States v. Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d 42, 47–48 (1st Cir. 2004)
(stating the first action to be the district court’s refusal to allow Mr. Sanchez to
withdraw).
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issue controlled by the Sixth Amendment. 266 Because United
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez 267 had not yet been decided, Wheat v.
United States 268 was controlling Supreme Court law regarding a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice. 269
Following Wheat should have led to the conclusion that such an
indigent criminal defendant is permitted to dismiss retained
counsel. Therefore, the only question left would be whether the
defendant seeks court-appointed counsel or intends to waive the
right to counsel and proceed pro se. 270 If the defendant thereafter
seeks the appointment of counsel, the court has a duty to
determine the defendant’s eligibility and appoint counsel if so
required. 271
266. See Bruce J. Winick, Forfeiture of Attorneys’ Fees under RICO and CEE
and the Right to Counsel of Choice: The Constitutional Dilemma and How to Avoid
It, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 765, 786 (1989) (“Like many fundamental constitutional
rights, the right to counsel of choice is not absolute and may depend on the
financial resources of the individual who seeks to exercise it. The right, however,
is unquestionably an ‘essential component’ or ‘essential element’ of the sixth
amendment [sic].”).
267. 548 U.S. 140 (2006).
268. 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
269. See id. at 159 (accepting the premise that the right to counsel of choice
is an aspect of the Sixth Amendment). The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits relied
heavily on Gonzalez-Lopez, likely due to the clarity of the opinion concerning the
right to counsel of choice for different subclasses of criminal defendants, but the
fundamental nature of the right to counsel of choice was recognized in Wheat and
controlled at the time of the Mota-Santana decision. See Brown, 785 F.3d at 1343–
44 (recognizing the constitutional origins of a defendant’s right to counsel of
choice (citing Gonzalez Lopez, 548 U.S. 147–48); see also Jimenez-Antunez, 820
F.3d at 1270 (explaining the centrality of the right to counsel of choice in the Sixth
Amendment (citing Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 147–48)). The scope of this Sixth
Amendment right to counsel of choice is circumscribed by the requirement that
granting such a motion not “interfere[] with the fair, orderly, and effective
administration of the courts.” Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d at 1272.
270. See United States v. Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d 1267, 1272 (11th Cir.
2016)
[A] district court must determine that the criminal defendant either
will be represented by counsel or has made a knowing and voluntary
waiver of the right to counsel. If a defendant intends to move the court
to appoint counsel, the court should determine whether the defendant
is eligible for appointed counsel.
(citations omitted).
271. See Brown, 785 F.3d at 1345
[I]n federal court the question whether counsel should be appointed is
governed . . . by the [Criminal Justice Act]. Of course, as a practical
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Had the First Circuit treated the actions in Mr. Sanchez’s
motion to withdraw as defense counsel for Mr. Mota-Santana
separately, the court may have been forced to address criminal
defendants’ constitutional right to counsel of choice and may
thereafter have come to a different conclusion. It is also possible
that had the First Circuit first addressed this issue
post-Gonzalez-Lopez that it would have been compelled to confront
the Supreme Court’s express declaration that the “root” meaning
of the Sixth Amendment is the criminal defendant’s right to their
counsel of choice. 272 As such, the First Circuit may have come to
the same result regarding this issue as the Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits, both decided post-Gonzalez-Lopez. Nonetheless, the First
Circuit’s decision to treat the defendant’s motion as a single action
has some degree of merit.
It is critical to note that the trial court’s decision concerning
the indigent criminal defendant’s motion to dismiss retained
counsel will often effectively bind the court’s decision in the
subsequent action.273 The fact that the former action may be
determinative of the subsequent decision to appoint counsel does
not make the consideration of the issues separately any less
necessary. Doing so is the only way in which an indigent criminal
defendant will be able to enjoy the benefit of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel of choice. 274 Therefore, in order to properly provide
constitutional protections to indigent criminal defendants, such as
Mr. Mota-Santana, it is critical to first address the desire to
matter the two issues—discharge of retained counsel and appointment
of CJA counsel—are intertwined, and the decisions as to them will
ordinarily be considered and announced together. However, the
sequence and manner in which the two issues are addressed may not
leave the defendant without any counsel at all, absent a voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent decision to proceed pro se.
(citations omitted).
272. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 146–47 (discussing that the defendant’s
right to counsel of choice is the core of the Sixth Amendment).
273. See United States v. Brown, 785 F.3d 1337, 1345 (9th Cir. 2015) (stating
that although the two issues are separate, they are frequently intertwined, and a
decision concerning the defendant’s right to dismiss retained counsel will often
determine how the court must subsequently proceed).
274. See Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d at 1272 (“[W]e are not persuaded that the
only relevant action is the second request to engage new counsel or that the
motion to dismiss retained counsel no longer implicates the right to counsel of
choice.”).
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discharge counsel followed by addressing any wish to have counsel
appointed or to proceed pro se—the procedure adopted by both the
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits. 275
Several policy rationales likely framed the First Circuit’s
decision, such as: excess economic costs, 276 discouraging
gamesmanship by defendants and defense counsel, 277 and
promoting effective administration of the judicial system. 278 These
policy rationales are analogous to those that framed the Supreme
Court’s decision to restrict counsel of choice for indigent criminal
defendants with appointed counsel. 279 Specifically, with regard to
indigent criminal defendants seeking substitute court-appointed
counsel, these justifications “dictate that judges should consider
less severe remedies before exercising the removal option.” 280
These policy issues sufficiently justify the narrowly tailored right
to counsel of choice for indigent criminal defendants. Yet, it is
important to acknowledge and understand the distinction drawn
between the cases of Mr. Mota-Santana, Mr. Brown, and Mr.
Jimenez-Antunez and the cases of Mr. Cronic and Mr. Allen. 281 The
275. See Brown, 785 F.3d at 1346 (“Once a district court allows a financially
qualified defendant to exercise his right to fire his retained lawyer, § 3006A(b)
requires, absent a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent decision to proceed pro se,
that the court appoint a new attorney in his place.” (emphasis in original)
(citations omitted)); see also Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d at 1272 (describing the
proper procedure for handling an indigent criminal defendant’s desire to
discharge retained counsel).
276. See Anne Bowen Poulin, Strengthening the Criminal Defendant’s Right
to Counsel, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1213, 1258 (2006) (discussing the interest in
judicial economy deterring judges from appointing substitute court-appointed
counsel for an indigent criminal defendant).
277. See Jay Williams Burnett & Catherine Green Burnett, Ethical Dilemmas
Confronting a Felony Trial Judge: To Remove or Not to Remove Deficient Counsel,
41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1315, 1336 (2000) (discussing the importance of preserving
democratic ideals and judicial integrity and the strain placed by the request to
disqualify or replace counsel).
278. See id. (“A second cost factor is administrative and involves both the
delay in beginning a new trial and the judicial resources that were expended
throughout the course of the aborted trial.”).
279. See Keith Swisher, Disqualifying Defense Counsel: The Curse of the Sixth
Amendment, 4 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 374, 389–90 (2014) (discussing
the policy rationales behind denying indigent defendants’ right to counsel of
choice with regard to court-appointed counsel).
280. Id.
281. Compare United States v. Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d 42, 43–45 (1st Cir.
2004) (examining the case of an indigent criminal defendant’s request to

1790

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1743 (2017)

former group of defendants retained counsel and enjoy the
complete Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice. 282 Although
the right to counsel of choice is qualified for all criminal
defendants, 283 generally defendants with retained counsel can fire
counsel “for any reason or for no reason.”284
Despite numerous policy rationales pointing to the contrary,
to ensure that indigent defendants receive the benefit of the “root
meaning” of the Sixth Amendment,285 William Defendant and
other similarly situated indigent criminal defendants must be
permitted to discharge retained counsel and seek appointed
counsel without satisfying a good cause showing through proof of
a severe conflict of interest, breakdown in communication, or
another problem in the attorney-client relationship. This approach
is critical considering “until just last Term, no criminal defendant
had ever persuaded the Court to reverse a conviction solely on
counsel-of-choice grounds; many had tried in vain.” 286
discharge retained counsel and seek court-appointed counsel (emphasis added)),
and United States v. Brown, 785 F.3d 1337, 1340–43 (9th Cir. 2015) (considering
an indigent criminal defendant’s appeal from the denial of his motion to discharge
retained counsel and seek court-appointed counsel (emphasis added)), and United
States v. Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d 1267, 1269–70 (11th Cir. 2016) (considering
the issue of whether an indigent criminal defendant needs to show good cause in
order to discharge retained counsel and seek court-appointed counsel (emphasis
added)), with United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.21 (1984) (concluding
that the proper inquiry concerning an indigent criminal defendant’s request to
replace appointed counsel with subsequent appointed counsel is whether the
attorney is a “reasonably effective advocate” (emphasis added)), and United
States v. Allen, 789 F.2d 90, 91–92 (1st Cir. 2002) (discussing the standard
required to be shown for an indigent criminal defendant to replace appointed
counsel with subsequent appointed counsel (emphasis added)).
282. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148 (2006) (“Where
the right to be assisted by counsel of one’s choice is wrongly denied . . . it is
unnecessary to conduct an ineffectiveness or prejudice inquiry to establish a Sixth
Amendment violation.”).
283. See Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d at 1270 (discussing the criminal
defendant’s right to counsel of choice as being tailored by ensuring the “effective
administration of the courts”).
284. United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2010).
285. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 147–48 (“The right to select counsel of
one’s choice . . . has never been derived from the Sixth Amendment’s purpose of
ensuring a fair trial. It has been regarded as the root meaning of the
constitutional guarantee.”).
286. John Rappaport, The Structural Function of the Sixth Amendment Right
to Counsel of Choice 1–3, 2017 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (Univ. of Chi.,
Pub. Law Working Paper no. 611).
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In United States v. Luis 287 last term, the Supreme Court for
the first time vacated and remanded a case after finding that the
government’s action undermined the defendant’s fundamental
right to the assistance of counsel of the defendant’s choice. 288
Professor John Rappaport contends that the reason the Supreme
Court consistently denies relief for criminal defendants deprived
of the right to counsel of choice is that “the doctrine treats counsel
of choice not as individual right at all,” but is instead masked with
alternative motives.289 Whatever the theory may be to explain the
Court’s unwillingness to grant relief to defendants based solely on
the denial of their right to counsel of choice, one thing is certain: it
is incredibly difficult to have a conviction reversed solely on the
basis of a denial of the “root meaning” of the Sixth Amendment. 290
Professor Rappaport brings to light the significant
“disjuncture between what the Court says about the right to
counsel of choice and what it does when presented an asserted
violation of that right.”291 Due to the difficulty and extreme
unlikelihood of reversing a conviction based on the denial of a
defendant’s right to counsel of choice, 292 it is important that lower
courts apply a standard to indigent criminal defendants seeking to
substitute appointed counsel for retained counsel that allows
enjoyment of their full Sixth Amendment right. For example, the
government in United States v. Brown argued that several
prerequisites qualified Mr. Brown’s request to substitute
287. 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016).
288. See id. at 1096 (stating the conclusion of the Court).
289. See Rappaport, supra note 286, at 46 (“My claim is that the Court’s
decisions are explicable upon the realization that the doctrine treats counsel of
choice not as an individual right at all, but instead as a system-level safeguard
against a socialized criminal defense bar.”).
290. See id. at 1 (stating the Court’s finding that counsel of choice is the “root
meaning” of the Sixth Amendment and yet the Court has only specifically
remedied such a violation once).
291. Id.
292. See id. at 46
Scholarly analysis of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice
is largely critical. Motivating the criticism is a sense that the Court has
been getting the cases wrong. Until [United States v.] Luis, the Court
consistently rejected defendants’ counsel-of choice claims, even when
the balance of individual and government interests did not clearly
favor the state.
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appointed counsel for retained counsel. 293 The court responded
that “the government’s statutory interpretation would, in effect,
provide Brown with less access to counsel than that to which he is
constitutionally entitled, by potentially denying him any counsel if
he exercises his constitutional right to discharge retained
counsel.” 294
To adopt the statutory interpretation advocated by the
government in Brown295 would undoubtedly deny criminal
defendants like Mr. Mota-Santana the right to counsel of choice. 296
Because the Supreme Court has expressly recognized the
centrality of the right to counsel of choice in Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence, it is critical to apply this right to all those eligible
for its protection, specifically indigent criminal defendants seeking
to substitute court-appointed counsel for retained counsel. 297
293. See United States v. Brown, 785 F.3d 1337, 1345 (9th Cir. 2015)
The government maintains that, in cases like this one, . . . the factors
relevant to the appointment of counsel issue are “the timeliness of the
motion; the adequacy of the district court’s inquiry into the defendant’s
complaint; and the asserted cause for that complaint, including the
extent of the conflict or breakdown in communication between lawyer
and client (and the client’s own responsibility, if any, for that conflict).”
(quoting Martel v. Clair, 132 S. Ct. 1276, 1287 (2012)).
294. Id. at 1346.
295. See id. (stating the government’s position that several factors must be
considered prior to granting a defendant’s motion for retained counsel to
withdraw and for the court to appoint counsel).
296. See United States v. Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2004) (“In
short, we think the district court gave adequate attention to the issues raised by
defendant, and made appropriate inquiry into the causes and merits of the
complaints. We hold that it was well within its discretion in refusing to appoint
new counsel.”) The First Circuit came to this conclusion after considering the
existence of a conflict of interest between Mr. Mota-Santana and his counsel, an
inquiry inappropriate in cases presenting counsel of choice issues. See id. at 46
(“We . . . refuse appellant’s suggestion to treat this as a case presenting notice of
a potential conflict of interest requiring a special inquiry and the draconian
remedy of reversal without a showing of prejudice.”); Brown, 785 F.3d at 1347
(“The appropriate standard must reflect the Sixth Amendment right which
governs a particular case. Where, as here, the right to retained counsel of choice
is implicated, Rivera-Corona specifically held that the ‘extent-of-conflict review is
inappropriate.’” (quoting United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 981 (9th
Cir. 2010))).
297. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148 (2006)
Deprivation of the right [to counsel of choice] is “complete” when the
defendant is erroneously prevented from being represented by the
lawyer he wants, regardless of the quality of the representation he
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Further, due to the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to remedy
violations of criminal defendants’ right to counsel of choice, it is
essential to avoid such violations by ensuring that all criminal
defendants, including those indigent defendants discussed here,
are able to exercise their constitutional right without obstacles. To
provide otherwise would deny these indigent criminal defendants
any counsel if they choose to exercise their right to counsel of choice
by discharging their retained counsel. Such action affords less
access to counsel to these defendants than they are
constitutionally entitled. 298
To require that indigent criminal defendants seeking to
substitute appointed counsel for retained counsel show good cause
constitutes a denial of the right to counsel of choice, a structural
error warranting reversal without a showing of prejudice. 299 As
previously discussed, and highlighted by Professor Rappaport, the
Supreme Court is extraordinarily unlikely to rule in favor of a
criminal defendant appealing solely on the basis of the denial of
their right to counsel of choice, as the Court has only reversed such
a conviction once. 300 In order to ensure that indigent criminal
defendants do not find themselves up against all odds submitting
a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court after continued denials of
their Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice, it is necessary
to address the issue from the bottom-up.
Trial courts must not require indigent criminal defendants
seeking to substitute appointed counsel for retained counsel to
show good cause and engage in a conflict analysis. 301 Instead, trial
courts should recognize the right to counsel of choice in these
received. To argue otherwise is to confuse the right to counsel of
choice . . . with the right to effective counsel . . . .
298. See Brown, 785 F.3d at 1346 (describing the constitutional implications
of requiring a showing of good cause prior to granting a defendant’s motion to
discharge retained counsel and seek court-appointed counsel).
299. See id. at 1350 (“The denial of a defendant’s right to counsel of choice is
a structural error, requiring that convictions be vacated even without a showing
of prejudice.” (citing Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 150)).
300. See Rappaport, supra note 286, at 1–3 (discussing the Supreme Court’s
poor history of upholding and preserving criminal defendants’ right to counsel of
choice).
301. See United States v. Brown, 785 F.3d 1337, 1346 (9th Cir. 2015)
(concluding that a conflict of interest analysis is inappropriate where an indigent
criminal defendant seeks to discharge retained counsel).
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situations by separating the actions within a defense counsel’s
motion to withdraw into an issue concerning counsel of choice and
an issue concerning the right to court-appointed counsel. 302 Doing
so will safeguard these defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights. 303
Subsequent appellate courts must also recognize the division of
actions and identify denials of defendants’ right to counsel of
choice. Upon recognition of the denial, appellate courts must treat
such denials as structural errors and grant reversals without
requiring the defendant to show prejudice. 304
V. Conclusion
The American criminal justice system has grown and evolved,
and our constitutional rights and protections have grown and
evolved along with it. The Sixth Amendment rights, stemming
exclusively from the Counsel Clause, that American citizens enjoy
today grew out of a system where criminals accused of the most
heinous crimes were strictly forbidden from the assistance of
counsel out of fear of what it might do to the unstable
government.305 The Sixth Amendment’s Counsel Clause now
encompasses five separate rights for criminal defendants, 306 an
302. See United States v. Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d 1267, 1272 (11th Cir.
2016) (describing the court’s rejection of the First Circuit’s treatment of such
motions as containing one merged action). While these actions are to be treated
separately it is important to understand the issues are intertwined in the sense
that upon a court’s allowance of the defendant’s motion to discharge retained
counsel, it must thereafter appoint counsel or receive a waiver of the right to
counsel. See id. (“To be sure, a district court reviewing a motion to dismiss counsel
must know how the defendant wishes to proceed so that the defendant will not be
left without representation in violation of the Sixth Amendment.”).
303. See Brown, 785 F.3d at 1344 (“[T]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel
of choice means that a defendant has a right to ‘fire his retained . . . lawyer . . . for
any reason or [for] no reason.’” (quoting United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d
976, 980 (9th Cir. 2010))).
304. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 150 (“We have little trouble concluding
that erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel of choice, ‘with consequences
that are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate, unquestionably qualifies
as “structural error.’” (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 282 (1993))).
305. See TOMKOVICZ, supra note 29, at 5 (“The common law rule prohibiting
those charged with serious offenses from employing counsel was thought to be a
necessary measure to ensure the monarch’s preservation.”).
306. These rights include: (1) the right to counsel of choice; (2); the right to
court-appointed counsel; (3) the right to conflict-free counsel; (4) the right to the
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idea that may have never crossed the minds of the Ratifiers in
1791.307 The development of these rights inevitably led to conflict,
notably among the First Circuit and the Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits, concerning the rights to counsel of choice and
court-appointed counsel. 308 This conflict between circuits creates
confusion and provides for unequal enjoyment of the same
constitutional right. Such unequal enjoyment of what is
understood to be the “root meaning” of a constitutional amendment
may also be cause for concern regarding the integrity of the judicial
system.309
effective assistance of counsel; and (5) the right to represent oneself pro se. See
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147–48 (2006) (“The right to select
counsel of one’s choice . . . has been regarded as the root meaning of the
constitutional guarantee [of the Sixth Amendment].”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person
haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial
unless counsel is provided for him.”); Bonin v. California, 494 U.S. 1039, 1044
(1990) (“[A] defendant that shows an actual conflict need not demonstrate that
his counsel’s divided loyalties prejudiced the outcome of his trial.” (citing Cuyler
v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349–50 (1980))); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 689 (1984) (“[T]he purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth
Amendment is . . . to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial.”);
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975) (“The Sixth Amendment . . . grants
to the accused personally the right to make his defense. Although not stated in
the Amendment in so many words, the right to self-representation—to make one’s
own defense personally—is thus necessarily implied by the structure of the
Amendment.”); see also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490 (1978) (“The
mere physical presence of an attorney does not fulfill the Sixth Amendment
guarantee when the advocate’s conflicting obligations have effectively sealed his
lips on crucial matters.”).
307. See TOMKOVICZ, supra note 29, at 20 (“In 1791, that provision became the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”).
308. Compare United States v. Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 2004)
(requiring an indigent criminal defendant to show good cause in order to
discharge retained counsel and seek appointed counsel), with United States v.
Brown, 785 F.3d 1337, 1346 (9th Cir. 2015) (stating that a criminal defendant
need not show good cause in order to discharge retained counsel based on the
Sixth Amendment), and Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d at 1271 (citing favorably the
Ninth Circuit’s decision not to require indigent criminal defendants to satisfy a
showing prior to dismissing retained counsel).
309. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 147–48 (concluding that the right to
counsel of choice is the “root meaning” of the Sixth Amendment Counsel Clause).
One legal scholar argues that circuit splits in interpreting the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines are particularly undesirable due to the need for uniformity. See Seth
Yohalem, We’ll Always Have Parish: The Ninth Circuit Decision and Its
Implications for Enforcement of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 37 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 525, 545 (2004). The need for uniformity is even more
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At present, if William Defendant finds himself in the First
Circuit, he will be required to show a significant conflict of interest
or other extraordinary circumstance in order to dismiss his
retained counsel and receive court-appointed counsel. 310
Conversely, if William Defendant finds himself in the Ninth or
Eleventh Circuits, he will be permitted to dismiss his retained
counsel and then decide whether to seek court-appointed counsel
or proceed pro se. 311 Between these two standards, the Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits more fully realize and apply the constitutional
command set forth in Gonzalez-Lopez. 312 William Defendant’s
motion to substitute appointed counsel for retained counsel should
be treated as including two separate actions: (1) the desire to
discharge retained counsel and (2) the desire to subsequently be
represented by court-appointed counsel. 313 By treating these as
separate actions, and not merging them as did the First Circuit,
courts will necessarily have to apply the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to counsel of choice to the first action and
thereafter determine whether they are eligible for appointed
counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b).314
important when discussing enjoyment of a constitutional right to the same class
of citizens in different circuits.
310. See Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d at 48 (“[A] defendant ‘must show that the
conflict between lawyer and client was so profound as to cause a total breakdown
in communication,’ preventing an adequate defense.” (quoting United States v.
Myers, 294 F.3d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 2002))).
311. See Brown, 785 F.3d at 1348 (“[G]iven Brown’s right to discharge his
retained attorney if he chose to do so, it did not matter whether the court
considered Brown’s current lawyer well qualified, or prepared for trial,
or . . . better than the alternative.”); see also United States v. Jimenez-Antunez,
820 F.3d 1267, 1270 (11th Cir. 2016) (“A defendant exercises the right to counsel
of choice when he moves to dismiss retained counsel, regardless of the type of
counsel he wishes to engage afterward.”).
312. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148–48 (finding the right to counsel of
choice to be at the core of the Sixth Amendment and stating that deprivation
occurs when a defendant is prevented from being represented by the lawyer he or
she wants, regardless of the quality of representation received).
313. See Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d at 1272 (finding that a defendant’s
motion to dismiss retained counsel and seek court appointed counsel does not
include merged actions, but rather two distinct actions).
314. See Brown, 785 F.3d at 1346 (stating that the proper procedure for such
a motion is to apply the constitutional rule in the defendant’s favor followed by
application of “the appropriate statutory rule for the appointed of counsel to an
indigent defendant”).

IN THEIR DEFENSE

1797

To be clear, this proposed framework does not provide indigent
criminal defendants an excuse, on the eve of trial, to seek
substitution of appointed counsel for retained counsel. 315 A
criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice
can, and ought to be limited by “compelling purposes” such as
ensuring the “fair, efficient, and orderly administration of
justice.” 316 Aside from this general qualification of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel of choice for criminal defendants with
retained counsel, indigent defendants such as William Defendant
should not be required to satisfy any further judicially qualified
showing. To impose the burden of showing good cause on such
defendants will inevitably lead to erroneous denials of their Sixth
Amendment rights rarely corrected on appeal. 317

315. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 152 (2006) (“We have
recognized the trial court’s wide latitude in balancing the right to counsel of choice
against the needs of fairness, and against the demands of its calendar.” (citations
omitted)).
316. United States v. Ensign, 491 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007).
317. See Rappaport, supra note 286, at 1–3 (stating the extraordinarily
infrequent relief granted to criminal defendants appealing from a stated denial of
their Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice).

